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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the valuation of index options.

The first chapter

analyzes the value of early exercise for an index option, specifically the Standard and
Poor’s 100 Index (OEX) option. The value is found by estimating European put-call
parity and comparing it to the price difference between an American call and put.
Zivney (1991) estimated this value for closing prices. The value of early exercise is
re-estimated by using bid-ask prices and time-series/cross-sectional data analysis,
effectively mitigating the non-synchronous data problem and heteroskedasticity, which
may be severe in Zivney’s study. The results from using intraday bid-ask prices are
compared to last bid-ask and transaction prices. The value of early exercise is added
to the Black-Scholes European option model value, and the combination is found to
price index options better. The average estimate of early exercise is about 4.1 percent
for calls in-the-money and 10.87 percent for puts in-the-money.
The second chapter of the dissertation looks at various index proxies.

This

analysis seeks to discern how arbitragers are capturing arbitrage profits and thereby
keeping the options near some equilibrium price. The index is proxied with other index
options, the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index futures, and small mimicking portfolios of
stocks.

Arbitrage profits are examined. The benchmark prices are generated with the

Black-Scholes option pricing model, the Black-Scholes model plus the value of early
exercise found above, the binomial option pricing model, and put-call parity.

The

mimicking portfolios of stocks produce the poorest profits. This is due to the deviation
between the portfolio and the actual index increasing with time.

The final section examines price discovery. Using a technique relying on vector
error correction models, it is found that most price discovery is found in the cash OEX
index, with a smaller portion occurring in other options. Virtually no price discovery
is found in the SPX futures.

viii

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes the problems and some potential solutions inherent in
the valuation of index options. The findings should be relevant to market participants
who are attempting to achieve their investment objectives as effectively as possible and
to researchers who are concerned with security design and market efficiency.
Stock index options were initially offered in the early 1980’s as a response to
the risk-management needs of different groups of investors, especially portfolio traders.
As the name implies, a stock index option is an option whose underlying security is an
index. The index itself is not a traded security, but the stocks comprising it are. The
most popular option in terms of trading volume is written on the Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) 100 Index and began trading on March 11, 1983. Harvey and Whaley (1992b)
illustrate its growth in popularity by noting that the level of trading volume had reached
over 400,000 contracts per day by 1986.

The proper valuation of index options,

specifically the S&P 100 Index option, is a complex task because of their diverse
features and is the subject of this dissertation.
The first chapter of my dissertation concerns the early exercise feature of the
S&P 100 Index (OEX) option. This feature gives the holder the right to exercise the
option any time prior to expiration. Various researchers (for instance, Merton (1973))
have written that the only reason a call option should be exercised early is if the
dividend becomes large enough. So, investors are continually weighing the opportunity
cost of holding onto the option position and receiving a risk-free return against
exercising and receiving the dividend. However, even if the dividend feature of an
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index option could be properly modelled, Diz and Finucane (1993) and French and
Maberly (1992) show that there are other more important factors affecting the early
exercise decision.
Diz and Finucane (1993) studied the early exercise patterns of OEX options. Of
the options that were exercised in their sample, 30 percent of the calls and 38 percent
of the puts were exercised prior to maturity. Of these early call exercises, about 7
percent can be attributed to the dividend. Twenty-two percent are explained by the
wildcard feature1, and 48 percent are explained by the size of the bid-ask spread.
Nineteen percent are exercised because of unknown reasons, and the rest are exercised
because of a combination of reasons.

Therefore, a model that incorporates only

dividends as an impetus for early exercise is misspecified.
One problem, therefore, is to find an effective pricing mechanism for American
index options. The route taken here is to estimate the value of the early exercise feature
directly. Then, it will be added to the Black and Scholes [BS] (1973) European option
pricing model to produce a reasonable value for an American option. In other words,
since the only difference between a European and an American option is the early
exercise feature, a European option estimate plus the value of early exercise should give
a reasonable estimate of the value of an American option.

'Since the stocks making up the OEX cease trading at 3:00 P.M. Central Standard Time and the OEX
options continue trading until 3:15 P.M., there is a 15 minute window in which the option holder will
exercise a call (put) if he believes the implied index price has dropped (risen) to som e level below (above)
the actual 3:00 P.M. index price. This "wildcard" option has the same payoff pattern as a put. See
Flem ing and W haley (1994) or Chapter 4 o f this dissertation for a more detailed explanation.

Various researchers have estimated the value of early exercise. Brenner and
Galai (1986) estimated this value for puts using implied interest rates from put-call
parity and found it to be from 0.9 to 3.5 percent. Blomeyer and Johnson (1988) looked
at the difference in put values between the Geske and Johnson (1984) American option
pricing model and the BS model and found the value to be about four percent. Zivney
(1991) used put-call parity and the closing prices of the OEX option to find the value
for calls to be 3.5 percent and for puts to be 10 percent. This dissertation will overcome
some limitations of Zivney’s paper and otherwise extend it. This particular valuation
method has the advantage that it is contingent upon neither the level of dividends nor
the assumptions of a particular model.
This study improves upon Zivney (1991) by using intraday bid-ask prices (prices
at which investors can actually trade at that moment in time given their information) for
OEX options for 1986 thus mitigating much of the nonsynchronous data problem,
correcting for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity where needed, incorporating
dividend data, and using a more realistic proxy for the risk-free rate of interest. An
average estimate of early exercise for calls at-the-money is found to be 4.1 percent, and
for puts at-the-money it is 10.87 percent. For comparison, closing transaction and bidask quotes are also examined. It is further found that adding the value of early exercise
to the BS model gives a better estimate of market values than the Black-Scholes model
does alone.
The second section of my dissertation investigates the underlying security of an
index option and arbitrage relationships. The underlying security for an index option

is the index itself. Although the various indices were not traded during the time period
of this study, Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts, representing the S&P 500 index
stocks, are currently available on the American Stock Exchange. This security may one
day become an attractive to include in arbitrage portfolios. However, the individual
stocks comprising the various indices have always been available to arbitragers. This
feature has implications for valuation purposes, because most of the extant option
pricing models are based on arbitrage relationships. The issue is that since the index
is not traded, if prices drift from equilibrium values, there are no direct arbitrage forces
to pressure them back towards equilibrium.
It has been suggested that a portfolio of the actual stocks making up the index
could be used. For instance, if an index call became overvalued relative to the put, a
riskless arbitrage portfolio could be formed by writing the overvalued call, buying the
put, and buying the portfolio of stocks.

All of this would have to be done

simultaneously to ensure the risk-free status. It would be difficult, but not completely
impossible, to purchase all 100 stocks in the OEX simultaneously. But, if the put is
overvalued, then the arbitrage portfolio would require a long call, short put, and short
positions in all 100 equities simultaneously. The up-tick rule on the New York Stock
exchange would prevent the formation of this portfolio.

The up-tick rule requires

investors to wait until the last price change of a security is positive before initiating a
short sale. Therefore, the arbitrage forces for index options may not be as strong as
they are for equity options.

The purpose of this section of the dissertation is to analyze the mechanisms
arbitragers use to profit from index option mispricing and force prices back towards
equilibrium. Evnine and Rudd (1985) suggest that traders construct proxy portfolios of
several highly liquid stocks that closely mimic the index. They also suggest, along with
Fleming and Whaley (1994), that some arbitragers use the S&P 500 futures to value
OEX options. However, whether a proxy portfolio or S&P 500 futures are used, pricing
errors will develop relative to the OEX. Arbitrage, therefore, becomes risky. Another
alternative is the formation of a synthetic index using index options.
This study compares arbitrage profits using the synthetic index, S&P 500 futures,
and index proxy portfolios. Each proxy index is examined relative to put-call parity,
the Black-Scholes model, the Black-Sholes model plus the estimated value of early
exercise, and the binomial option pricing model.
Finally, the third chapter of the dissertation will look at price discovery in the
index option market. The analysis here will seek to determine where relevant pricing
information first enters the options market. The problem is that, while the option is
explicitly written on the Standard and Poor's 100 Index, investors might be receiving
pricing information from other sources. Already mentioned is the S&P 500 futures
market. Along with it, the actual OEX cash index and the index implied from put-call
parity will be examined.
The methodology used will rely on a system of equations made up of current and
lagged values of the indices called a vector autoregression. The innovations from the

system will then be incorporated into a vector moving average representation of the
same system. This makes it easier to discern where price discovery is taking place.

CHAPTER 1
THE VALUE OF EARLY EXERCISE
IN STANDARD AND POOR’S 100 INDEX OPTIONS

1.1

Literature Review
European options cannot be exercised prior to maturity. However, American

options give the holder the right to exercise any time up to and including maturity.
Merton (1973a and 1973b) provided the conditions for rational early exercise of
American options and showed that the early exercise feature of the American option
makes it at least as valuable as its European counterpart. The importance of the early
exercise feature as a determinant of American options prices was demonstrated by
Whaley (1982) and Geske and Roll (1984). Both studies empirically examined option
pricing models that incorporated a positive probability of early exercise. They found
that these option pricing models valued American style options more accurately than
European option pricing models.
Investors, also, seem to value the early exercise feature, judging by the
percentage of options that are exercised early.

According to French and Maberly

(1992), of the Standard and Poor’s 100 Index (OEX) options that were exercised
between April, 1983 and March, 1990, approximately 28 percent of the calls were
exercised early.

For the period from April, 1983 until December, 1988, Diz and

Finucane (1993) find that 30% of the exercised OEX calls and 38% of the exercised
OEX puts are exercised early.
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The question remains, however, as to the value investors place on the early
exercise feature. Brenner and Galai (1986) examined implied interest rates from put-call
parity for American equity options.

They compared the rate from deep-out-of-the-

money puts (options that should not be rationally exercised) to rates from other exercise
prices. The difference was what they called the value of early exercise. It ranged from
0.9% to 3.5%. Blomeyer and Johnson (1988) compared the accuracy of the Geske and
Johnson (1984) American put valuation model with the Black-Scholes put valuation
model. The difference between the model values could be looked at as the value of
early exercise. It was about 4% for puts in-the-money. However, since this estimate
is based on model values, any mis-specification can interfere with an accurate
measurement of early exercise. Zivney approximated the market value of the early
exercise feature of American options and based his study on the 1985 closing prices of
the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s (CBOE) Standard and Poor’s 100 Index option.
He found the value to be about 3.5% for calls and 10% for puts.
Zivney defined this value to be the price difference between an American call
and put and the identical European options.

More specifically, he examined the

deviation from European put-call parity. That is, using his notation, the value of early
exercise is:
A = l(CA - PA) - (CE - PE)’I

(1)

where (CA- PA) is the difference between an American call and put on the same security
with the same strike price and expiration date trading at the same moment, and (CE PE)’ represents the left hand side of the European put-call parity relationship:

9
C-e "

= S - Dt - X e |T,

(2)

where C is the price of the call, P is the price of the put, S is the price of the underlying
security, DT is the discounted value of dividends between the current date and
expiration, X is the strike price, r is the risk-free rate of interest, and T is the time to
expiration.
Zivney used the put-call parity relationship rather than European and American
option pricing models to develop the early exercise value. Stoll (1969) showed that this
relationship suggests that, if the price of a European call is known, the price of the put
with the same exercise price and time to maturity on the same underlying security can
be calculated. Because put-call parity is built on the concept of a replicating portfolio,
testing can be done on actual market prices, and, therefore, there is no need for a joint
test of a model to determine which is superior.
Zivney also observed that this measure of early exercise value behaved like an
option. It increased with increases in the time to expiration, the risk-free interest rate,
and the index price. The value of early exercise decreased with increases in the exercise
price. He proposed that adding this observed value to the theoretical price of an option
obtained from the Black-Scholes European option model would result in an "ap
propriate" value of an American option.
While Zivney’s assertion that his measurement is actually the value of early
exercise is reasonable, there are several weaknesses in his paper. First, Zivney used the
closing prices of the Standard and Poor’s 100 Index and the associated options for the
year 1985. There are problems with this, including the problem of non-synchronous
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data. Zivney found 3635 pairs of options matching for put-call parity. By definition,
they would have to trade simultaneously. However, using the data described in Section
1.3 below, it was found that the average of the absolute value of the differences in the
times of the last call and put trades was about 57 minutes. The average of the absolute
value of the differences in the times between the last call trade and the three o’clock
index close was about 40.31 minutes, and the same measure for puts was approximately
42.18 minutes. Bodurtha and Courtadon (1986) demonstrate that the non-simultaneity
of spot and option prices in the currency option market produces a significant number
of put-call parity boundary violations.
Also, French and Maberly (1992) have examined the problem of using the last
trade of the day involving the OEX option. The idiosyncrasy in question is the so-called
wildcard feature. The wildcard occurs during the period after the stock market closes,
3:00 P.M., and when the OEX stops trading, 3:15 P.M. Central Standard Time. The
settlement price of the option exercise is based upon the 3:00 P.M. index closing price.
The option holder can exercise the option at any point between those two times, and he
may be inclined to do so if he believes that the implied index is priced differently from
its closing price. For instance, some type of bad news can occur after the stock market
closes that may affect stock prices, or the investor may observe lower stock prices on
other exchanges. In this instance, it may be optimal to exercise an in-the-money call
early. Since it would not be optimal to exercise before the close, closing prices are
affected by the wildcard feature. Therefore, closing prices of the OEX should not be
used to determine the value of early exercise on this index option. So, Zivney might
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be measuring the value of the wildcard option, the value of early exercise, or a
combination of both.
Second, in the last half hour of trading, market-makers are making adjustments
to meet margin requirements. This influences both the price and the volume of options.
Along the same lines, Evnine and Rudd (1985) study the efficiency of the OEX
market using intraday bid-ask quotes and find the market to be less than completely
efficient. Evnine and Rudd cite an earlier version (Evnine and Rudd, 1983) of their
study in which they used closing prices and found different results. So, the time factor
does seem to matter.
In the first half hour of trading, each option series is being opened, and overnight
limit orders are being filled. These prices may not be representative of a "typical"
option. This study solves the beginning- and end-of-day problems by creating a five
minute bid-ask price series by choosing the latest bid-ask quote in each five minute
interval between the hours of 9:00 A.M. and 2:45 P.M.2 If there is no change in the
quote for a particular interval, the latest prevailing quote is used.3 This effectively
eliminates any bias arising from the opening or the closing, and the non-synchronous
problem is also mitigated by the use of bid-ask data. These prices indicate what an
r

investor could trade at that particular moment, given the information he has on the price
of the index at that moment.

T o r the tim e period o f this study, OEX options were traded on the CBOE from 8:30 A.M. until 3:15
P.M. Central Standard Time each weekday.
3A current bid or ask quote is good for ten option contracts.
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Third, Zivney incorporated interest rates implied from the parity relationship.
Previous studies on the implied interest rate from American options using put-call parity,
such as those by Brenner and Galai (1986) and Frankfurter and Leung (1991), have
found negative interest rates. Brenner and Galai (1986) found that, if early exercise
were doubtful, option positions could be a substitute for riskless investments.
Conversely, they discovered that a strong possibility of early exercise causes the interest
rate implied by put-call parity to stray from market risk-free rates. Zivney does not
mention whether he did or did not find negative rates or, if he did, what relevance they
had. However, whether he found them or not, the rate implied from American options
using European put-call parity will be downwardly biased. And, in general, the rate
implied from index options, whether American or European, will also be downwardly
biased. In Zivney’s study, because a single implied interest rate was calculated for each
maturity everyday, and this rate was assigned to various levels of strike prices, there was
a possibility that a single negative rate would be applied to many options which
otherwise might have had positive rates.
Using my call bid and put ask prices, the number of options with negative rates
did turn out to be very large. With no filters on the data, 42.64% of the options were
assigned negative interest rates when the discounted dividends were left out. With the
dividends included, the percentage dropped to 7.88.
There are two explanations for the downwardly biased interest rates.

First,

although a European put-call relationship is being assumed, the actual put and call prices
are based on American options. The put-call parity relationship for an American option
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is founded on an inequality rather than a strict equality. In fact, according to Brenner
and Galai (1986), the implied rate is defined by the upper boundary of the American
relationship as
CA - PA < S - Dt - X e "

(3)

So, the interest rate must be downwardly biased to force this into a European style
relationship. In other words, to make the above relationship into an equality, a lower
interest rate must be used.

So, for this reason, the implied rate from an American

option would be inappropriate.
Second, the implied risk-free rate should be downwardly biased when considering
an index option. Two types of arbitrage situations can result. There can be a situation
in which the call is relatively more expensive than the put. In this case, an investor will
write the call, buy the put and buy the index to make arbitrage profits. This ensures that
any mispricing along these lines will not last long. Even though it would be difficult
to buy all 100 of the stocks comprising the S&P 100 Index simultaneously, it would not
be impossible. Also, according to Evnine and Rudd (1985), investors can construct
proxy portfolios consisting of many fewer stocks.
However, if the put is relatively more expensive than the call, arbitrage is
generally not possible. An investor would have to write the put, buy the call, and short
the index. The problem is that an index is made up of a portfolio of stocks. It would
be almost impossible to find a situation in which every stock in the index could be
shorted simultaneously; i.e. every stock's previous trade would have to have been on an
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up-tick. Even if a proxy portfolio could be found consisting of only a handful of stocks,
the investor would encounter the same problem.
So, in the first arbitrage situation, the price of the put is being driven up, and the
price of the call is being forced down. In the second situation, arbitrage is not possible,
so the price of the put can become relatively much larger than the price of the call.
From Equation (4), it can be seen that this situation can lead to the numerator of the
fraction being, sometimes, greater than the denominator when looking at transaction
prices; i.e., the natural log of a number greater than one is positive and, combined with
the negative sign in front, can lead to negative interest rates.
r’ = -( Ln (( S - Dx - C + P )/ X))/T.

(4)

Since only the lending side of the process is being examined, this situation would not
affect this study, but Zivney’s interest rates may have been affected. The problem
remains, however, that the rate in this study would be biased downwardly if the rate
implied from American options is employed.
To further demonstrate that there may have been a problem with Zivney’s
implied rates, his footnote number four regresses his implied rates on the time to
maturity and the moneyness of the options. He finds a statistically significant negative
relationship between the interest rate and the time to maturity. However, looking at
market rates during 1985, the yield curve is upward sloping.
Fourth, as Stoll (1969) found in his data, there is both heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation in the market data.

Zivney makes no mention of this or of any

corrections he may have made, and, therefore, his conclusions may be questionable; i.e.,
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his estimators may be unbiased but inefficient. So, any tests using these estimators
cannot be relied upon.
And fifth, Zivney ends his paper with the hypothesis that the value of early
exercise plus the Black-Scholes (1973) option value might produce a "better" estimate
of an American option value. The Black-Scholes (1973) model has certain empirically
documented biases in it. For instance, it prices options well at-the-money, but becomes
less precise as the option gets deeper in- or out-of-the-money. If the value of early
exercise can partially account for these biases, a more accurate method for valuing
options will have been found. He gives no empirical evidence that this combination
would price American options more accurately, but, logically, this makes sense. This
possibility is tested.
The next section of this paper describes the data and methodology used to
improve upon Zivney’s original work and test his hypothesis that the value of early
exercise plus the option value calculated from the Black-Scholes (1973) model will
produce a "better" value for an American option. Both intraday and end of day prices
are used for comparison and contrast.

1.2

Method of Analysis
The general technique applied here is initially very similar to the method used

by Zivney. The logic of using put-call parity to value the early exercise feature is as
follows. American options can be exercised early. If investors believe that the early
exercise feature has value, there will be a difference in price between American and
European options.

This value can be found by comparing the difference between
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American puts and calls and European puts and calls. Therefore, since the American
call and put bid-ask prices can be observed and assigned to the same relationship as in
the left hand side of equation 2, (CA - PA), and the only difference between American
and European options is the possibility of early exercise, then the difference between
(CA - PA) and the right hand side of equation 2 can be called the value of early exercise.
As mentioned, this study makes use of bid-ask prices. In the put-call parity
relationship, borrowing and lending relationships can be developed using bid-ask prices.
Assuming there are no profitable riskless arbitrage opportunities available, the investor
can lend through the following relationship:
P + S - C = Xe'n

(5)

That is, he can buy a put, buy the index (the stocks comprising the index or a
reasonable proxy portfolio), and write the call. Of course, since all of this must be done
simultaneously, the investor will be a price taker; so, in this case, the put will be the put
ask price and the call will be the call bid.
An investor can borrow Xe'11 dollars by buying a call, shorting the index, and
writing the put. That is,
-P - S + C = -Xe "

(6)

Therefore, he will buy the call at the ask and sell the put at the bid. In fact, he must
short the index (stock) at the bid also, but that will not be examined here, because the
S&P 100 index is not a traded security, although the stocks that make it up are.
Therefore, because of the immense difficulty that would occur in trying to short all 100
stocks in the index at the same moment, it will be assumed that the investor is in a
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lending situation. The put ask and call bid prices will be employed, unless specifically
mentioned to the contrary.

1.3

Data
The 1986 option and index data of the S&P 100 Index employed in this study

were obtained from the resorted format of the Berkeley Options Data Base tapes. The
data is re-sorted by date, time, and stock symbol. Although Zivney used 1985 data for
his study (he does not mention using the Berkeley option tapes), the Berkeley option
tapes are unreliable for the S&P 100 data prior to 1986 and S&P 500 values through
1986. Specifically, the index values were mis-coded for various time periods before
1986. Sheikh (1991) found errors in the consolidated format. The same type of errors
are in the resorted format. Bid-ask price data was gathered for the entire year of 1986
at five minute intervals throughout each day, as described previously. In addition, the
last bid-ask and transaction prices are collected each day.
3,755,834 OEX bid-ask records were found for puts and calls on the tapes for
1986. The figures for the bid-ask prices are found in rounded form on the tapes. For
instance, instead of a bid price of 1262.5 cents, this would be recorded as 1263 cents.
Since prior research has indicated that price discreetness is important (see Chan, Chung,
and Johnson (1993), for example), the prices were corrected for this study. In other
words, using the figures above as an example, 1263 was corrected to 1262.5.
The bid-ask data was filtered in several stages. First, although Zivney used
closing prices, this study uses the entire day’s worth of data, except for the first and last
half hour. Sheikh (1991) pointed out that overnight limit orders make up the bulk of
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the trades in the first half hour of trading. In the last fifteen minutes to half hour,
market makers are cleaning up their books to meet margin requirements. Also, there
is the wildcard option problem. This brought the total number of records down to
3,289,513. The data was next paired by puts and calls with the same strike price and
maturity date in five minute intervals.
Second, any set of prices in which the index value was greater (less) than the
value of the strike price plus (minus) the call (put) in-the-money was deleted, because
it would indicate non-synchronous problems and would not meet put-call parity. Table
A1 shows that this filter removed roughly 3.1 percent of the five minute interval series.
According to Whaley (1982), the CBOE does not allow new positions to be
established in options whose premia is below fifty cents. Therefore, all pairs where
either the bid or the ask is below fifty cents are deleted.
Finally, all observations which occurred in the expiration week were deleted.
Several authors, including Day and Lewis (1988), attribute higher volatility to expiration
week. The main data set (607,420 call bid and put ask prices or 303,710 matches for
put-call parity) consisted of all pairs of puts and calls that matched as to date, maturity,
and strike in five minute intervals for 1986. The index value was the value at the five
minute mark. This effectively removes the non-synchronous problem. For instance, the
amount of time it takes from the moment a trade takes place until the time it gets
stamped is no longer a problem. What are left are the prices at which traders can make
transactions given their information on the index value. The other two data sets consist
of final bid-ask or transaction prices. The last index price is the closing index price
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each day. These two sets of final prices may be strongly affected by non-synchroneity,
as the final price for one option in a pair may occur several hours earlier than the other.
The dividend data came from Harvey and Whaley (1992). Harvey and Whaley
(1992) demonstrate that dividends on the S&P 100 Index are highly cyclical and, while
on average are small compared to the value of the index, at various times they are large
enough for calls to exhibit a positive probability for early exercise. Their dividend
series consists of daily cash dividends on the S&P 100 Index from 1982 through 1988.
This paper employs 1986 data along with the first four months of 1987.

For each

option, all daily cash dividends paid between the current date and the maturity date of
the option were discounted back from the date of the dividend payment to the current
date, as in the formula,

DT = t D i e -rt‘

(7)

i-l

where r is the risk-free rate of interest, Dj is the ith dividend paid between the current
date and maturity, and t| is the period from the current date until the ith dividend is paid.
N is the number of daily dividends paid between the current date and maturity date.
The normal procedure is to discount dividends from the ex-dividend date to the option
trade date. However, this is an index consisting of a portfolio of 100 stocks of large
companies. Therefore, the actual day of the dividend payment was used, as Brenner and
Galai (1986) did for individual stocks and Sheikh (1991) did for the S&P 100. This
method assumes that dividend payments are known beforehand. But, Brenner and Galai
point out that, with very large companies, this is a reasonable assumption. Figlewski
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(1984) makes the assertion that, for highly diversified portfolios such as this, uncertainty
about the dividend stream is insignificant.

Black (1975) suggests netting out the

dividends from stock prices for equity options. Corrado and Miller (1993) state that this
method should also be used with index options. Harvey and Whaley (1992) concur with
netting out the present value of expected dividends from the index value. That is done
here.
The interest rate used to discount the dividends was the T-bill risk-free rate, as
Harvey and Whaley (1992) did. For each day of the option’s life, the T-bill rate on that
day was used in the model. The T-bill that matured just following the expiration of the
option was chosen. It was employed rather than the T-bill that matured two days before
the option's expiration date for several reasons. First, since that T-bill matured two days
before the option, there would be two days when there would be no rate at which to
discount the dividend. Second, the Wall Street Journal, from which the rates were
obtained, listed the rates only until several days before the T-bill matured. For instance,
The T-bill maturing on January 16, 1986 (January option maturity was on the 18th) was
quoted until January 14th. Therefore, the T-bill that matured the soonest after the
option’s expiration was chosen.
Given that a lending relationship is examined, the t-bill rate is appropriate. This
is the minimum rate an investor would accept to construct this portfolio. It would be
unreasonable to assume that an investor would take on a risk-free investment that returns
less than the risk-free t-bill rate.
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T-bill rates, discounted dividends, observed index values, strike prices, and times
to maturity were substituted into Equation (2) to find the value for European put-call
parity. Some simple statistics on the data can be found in Table A2.

1.4

Econometric Models
If the early exercise feature gives the holder of the option a right that is valued,

then it should have movements that have been theorized for options. This hypothesis
is tested with the following model, which is known in the econometric literature as the
Hsiao (1975) random coefficients model [RCM]:
Ait = Poi. + M S U- x i.) + 02iig(Tit) + P3ith(rit) + P4ili(ait) + ui(

(8)

where Ait is the estimated value of early exercise, f(S lt - X J is the degree the option is
in the money, g(Tit) is the number of days until maturity, h(rH) is the risk-free rate of
interest, and i(oit) is a measure of volatility based on the standard deviation of returns
of the index over the past sixty days.
If A is an option, it should increase in value with the increases in moneyness,
days to maturity, and the risk-free rate of interest. Because of the manner in which the
estimate of early exercise is calculated, separate tests are made on put-call parity pairs
where the call is in-the-money and where the put is in-the-money. Therefore, when the
call is in-the-money, the signs of the coefficients should be positive. When the put is
in-the-money, however, it should be remembered that A will be negative. So, the sign
of the moneyness coefficient should be positive, and the rest should be negative. Zivney
found the theorized signs.

Furthermore, these movements should be statistically

significant if investors value this right.
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Because of the form of the data, we argue that a representation of the data
generation process based on the Hsiao (1975) random coefficients model, equation 8,
would be appropriate. This model recognizes that the coefficients may vary over crosssections and time. Ordinary least squares is inefficient under these conditions. For
instance, from equation (8), the change in the index value (S) is the same for each A,
but the strike price (X) is or can be different. Therefore, a change in S will affect
different As differently. The average effect over all individuals will show up in the
coefficient, but the individual reactions will go into the error.
This formulation indexes all coefficients and variables across individuals and
time.

It is based on the idea that, whether we have data measured in five minute

intervals or at the close of trading, each measure of A may respond differently in each
time period and for each individual to changes in the independent variables.

The

possibility that there are different individuals or different numbers of individuals in each
time period means that there is very likely that there is heteroskedasticity present. For
instance, A derived from an option pair where the call is deeply in the money is going
to respond differently to a change in the risk-free rate of interest in each time period
from when A is derived from a pair of options where the call is near-the-money.
The variance of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is biased in this case,
because the first assumption of the classical linear regression model is violated. This
assumption requires the parameters of the model to remain constant. This means that
the test statistics will be unreliable due to inefficiency. This results in OLS estimators
that are unbiased but inefficient.

However, the estimated generalized least squares
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estimator variance is unbiased, because it accounts for the heteroskedasticity produced
by the random coefficients.

The estimated generalized least squares estimator is

asymptotically consistent and more efficient than the OLS estimator. The model we
propose produces an efficient estimator.
In the Hsiao model, the Pkil s are random variables, with means 0*, the population
average response coefficient. Therefore, each coefficient can be thought of as being an
average estimate plus a component specific to time and a component specific to an
individual:
(9)

Pjcit = P* + ^ + etwhere
Vj ~ N(0,av2),
et ~ N(0,<je2),
eit ~ N(0,o £2),
C O V (V j,V j) =

0 ,

cov(e,,es) = 0,
cov(Vi,et) = 0.

The Ujt random errors can be broken down into three parts,
k
k
Ui t = E V±Xi t + E e t x i t + ®it ’
1

and are distributed N (0,oJ where

(

10)

Thus

is the average intercept, v, is the deviation from the mean for the ith individual

and is constant over time. e„ on the other hand, varies over time but is constant over
individuals.
Zivney did not recognize the time series/cross-sectional nature of his data and
estimated equation (8) as an ordinary least squares model where the parameters are
considered to be constant.

This formulation assumes that v, = e0 = 0.

Also, the

heteroskedasticity in e is ignored:
A = P0 + M S - X) + p2g(T) + p3h(r) + e.

(11)

Several potential problems lie in using the Hsiao procedure with this data set.
It assumes each individual estimated value of early exercise will react to changes in the
independent variables in the same way over time.

It also assumes that all of the

estimated values of early exercise react in the same way to some factor in a given time
period. For instance, it would assume, if the put-call parity pairs of options in one
cross-section included one pair at-the-money, one pair where the call is five dollars inthe-money, and one pair where the put is five dollars in-the-money, that these would
react in the same way in a time period to some influence.

Since the tests are run

separately for puts in-the-money and calls in-the-money, the reactions of the estimated
values to changes in the independent variables should be similar. A cross-section of
calls in the money will react in the same way to a change in the interest rate whether
they are near-the-money or far in-the-money. Only the degree of the reaction will be
different. Over time, the story is much the same. The reaction would change to the
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greatest degree when, for instance, a call goes from in- to out-of-the-money. Since the
tests control for this, there should be little difficulty in interpretation.
In the random coefficients model we estimate, the time series component will be
represented by the usual five minute intervals for the intraday data and days for the endof-day data. The cross sections are define by the degree of moneyness. The reasoning
is as follows.
The method of estimating early exercise depends on the difference between the
values of a call and a put, one being in-the-money and the other out-of-the-money.
Since it would be irrational for an investor to exercise the option that is out-of-themoney, it is logical to believe that the early exercise value connected to that option is
nil.

However, it should not be zero.

We can assume this because of an arbitrage

argument: if the value of early exercise were zero except when the option went intothe-money, an investor could buy the option the instant before it became in-the-money
(assuming this could be predicted), hold it until it went into-the-money an instant later,
and then sell it after it jumped in price due to the early exercise value. This is contrary
to observation and theory. Therefore, out-of-the money options must have a positive
value of early exercise due to the probability that they will go into-the-money. Using
Zivney’s method of finding this value for near-the-money options can only give a
muddy picture of the true value for options that are near-the-money.4 For this reason,
the cross-sections are defined as to the degree of moneyness. The cross-sections are

4OLS estim ates were obtained on the data both where one o f the options was at least five percent inthe-money and where both options were within five percent o f being at-the-money. The signs o f the
coefficients were correct in the first case but not in the second.
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delineated at five percentage point intervals in the degree of moneyness. For 1986, the
degree of moneyness ranged from being in-the-money by 15.55 percent for calls and inthe-money by 13.18 percent for puts.
Also, it should be noted that none of the data sets here or in Zivney is a
homogeneous time series.

For instance, in the intraday data set, each five minute

interval may contain a different number of observations. In addition, even if there are
the same number of observations in each interval, the quotes in one interval may be
based on a completely different set of options from the previous interval. This means
that the concept of stationarity is not an issue here.
The estimation method is maximum likelihood (ML).

This means that the

sample estimator, if, is consistent, it is asymptotically normal, and asymptotically
efficient. Judge, et. al. (1985) show that the estimators have the same form as estimated
generalized least squares (EGLS) estimators, but the unknown disturbance covariance
matrix here is based on maximizing a log-likelihood function rather than a least squares
estimate. This is important, because even though both the ML and the EGLS estimators
are asymptotically consistent, the EGLS estimators are not necessarily as efficient as the
ML estimators.5
Finally, we want to determine whether or not the addition of the early exercise
estimate to the European Black-Scholes value can give a better approximation to the

5SAS’s PROC MIXED is used to estimate the model. A GROUP effect is specified
to allow the coefficients to vary.
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market value of options than the Black-Scholes model alone. The theorized relationship
is:6

IB^option "

^ l^^option + A - A c t U a l 0p C^0n |

(12)

where the Black-Scholes values are given by

c a l l = S*N(d1) - Xe~rTN(d2)
and

p u t = xe~lTiv ( - d 2) - s*N{- dr)

where

d

. in(syx) + rr ^ 1
Oy/T

and

d2 = d1 - OifT.

J J .

2

(13)

Black-Scholes option prices are formed with S* representing the market determined
index value less the discounted dividends, X is the contractually specified strike price,
the time to maturity is T, the T-bill rate of interest proxies for the risk-free rate, r, and
a is the historical volatility mentioned above.

N(d,) and N(d2) are cumulative

probabilities for unit normal variables.
The intuition behind this test is based on the theorized relationship between
American and European options. Theory tells us that an American option is worth at
least as much as its European counterpart. Furthermore, if investors value the right to

*This test was suggested by Mitchell Stem at the 1994 Eastern Finance Association Meeting.
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exercise early, then the American option will be greater than the otherwise equivalent
European option. So, if the relationship in equation 12 holds, we can infer that investors
value the early exercise feature, and its addition to the Black-Scholes model value gives
us a better estimate of market-determined American options than the Black-Scholes
values alone.
The random coefficients model is also used here. The reasons are similar to
those given above. Each Black-Scholes value and each market determined price can
vary over time along with the estimates of early exercise. In addition, for any time
period, there may be different options and different numbers of options.

1.5

Empirical Results
The estimated value of early exercise is calculated as the difference between the

left-hand side of equation 3 and the right-hand side of equation 2. For those instances
involving calls in-the-money with a positive value of A and puts in-the-money with a
negative value of A, the average values of early exercise are 4.1% and 10.87%
respectively for the 5 minute data. The last quote prices finds a higher estimated value
of early exercise for calls at 6.88%, and the figure for puts is 8.76%. The last trade data
shows the value to be 4.57% for calls and 9.45% for puts.
To test the hypothesis that Zivney used an incorrect testing procedure, tests
similar to his are conducted using intraday bid-ask data, end-of-day bid-ask data, and
end-of-day transaction data for 1986. The positive value of early exercise from calls inthe-money was regressed on the moneyness, time to maturity, and the risk-free rate of
interest from the corresponding call.

Ordinary least squares regressions are first
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executed. A quick examination of the Durbin-Watson statistic reveals that it is less than
one on several occasions and does not come close to 2 in the remainder of the tests.
So, corrections are made for autocorrelation by using the Prais-Winsten transformation.
Regressions are executed for values from puts in-the-money that have a negative value
of early exercise. The purpose of this is to compare the reaction of the value of early
exercise to theorized movements of options. The results are in Tables 1, la, and lb.
In Table 1, all matches where the calls that should be exercised early, according
to the dividend rule, have been left out. For comparison, Table la leaves them in. This
means that it is less likely that the value of early exercise will show up in Table 1, and
there is more of a possibility of it appearing la. As can be seen from Tables 1, la, and
lb, the coefficients and the degrees of significance change depending on the data set
*
■
*
—
+' being examined. In addition, the coefficients are not what theory would predict in all
cases. We would expect that if any one of the data sets would produce the hypothesized
coefficients, the five minute data would produce them, because it is made up of
synchronous data. However, not all coefficients are as hypothsized. For instance, the
coefficient on the interest rate variable for the intraday data in Table lb is a good
example.

Therefore, a test to determine whether the coefficients are changing is

conducted.
Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl, and Lee (1985) suggest the Breusch-Pagan test
for heteroskedasticity induced by the random coefficients. This is a Lagrange multiplier
test that is asymptotically distributed %2(K_n. It tests for the error variance being related
to more than one variable by taking the residuals from the original estimated model,
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squaring them, and regressing them on the variables that are thought to be causing the
variance. These could be all of the variables in the original model. The regression sum
of squares from this second regression is divided by two times the square of the sum
of the squared errors divided by the number of observations from the first regression to
form the test statistic. The intuition is that if the independent variables in the second
model explain the dependent variable(the squared errors from the first model), then the
test statistic will be large and the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the second
model are zero will be rejected. The results in Tables 1, la, and lbclearly indicate a
rejection of the null. This leads us to conclude that heteroskedasticity is present and
may be caused by random coefficients. In addition, using equation (11) and OLS as
Zivney did, the data is examined quarter by quarter.

Each quarter’s modelreveals

coefficients different from the next and different degrees of significance, along with
some signs that are not as hypothesized.
Table 1. Generalized Least Squares Estimates Using Prais-Winsten Two-step
Estimators for: A = b0 + b,f(S - X) + b2g(T) + b3h(r) + e
Where Calls are in-the-money and A > 0
AH Data Are Included Except Where DT > X(1 - e'rT)

b0

b,

b2

b3

BP Test

Last Trade Data
652 Observations

0.153
(0.425)

0.022
(7.203)**

0.004
(3.553)**

2.800
(0.466)

78.135

Last Quote Data
851 Observations

0.6411
(3.696)**

0.02733
(10.833)**

0.00123
(1.552)

-7.191
(-2.570)**

108.602

5 minute data
38356 Observations

-0.26402
(-6.680)**

0.01407
(31.841)**

0.00025
(2.562)**

11.2454
(17.332)**

11971.220

Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. The degree of significance is for a one-tailed test.
** Significant at the .01 level * Significant at the .05 level
BP Test is the Breusch-Pagan Test
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Table la. Generalized Least Squares Estimates Using Prais-Winsten Two-step Estimators
for: A = b„ + b,f(S - X) + b2g(T) + b,h(r) + e
Where Calls Are in-the-money and A > 0
All Data Are Included

b0

b,

b,

bj

BP Test

Last Trade Data
765 Observations

0.245
(0.789)

0.022
(7.943)**

0.004
(3.827)**

1.172
(0.223)

96.677

Last Quote Data
1996 Observations

0.8437
(13.542)**

0.01688
(7.621)**

0.0132
(21.712)**

-18.671
(-21.401)**

41.569

5 minute data
41415 Observations

-0.16833
(-4.698)**

0.01378
(32.298)**

-0.00008
(-0.993)

10.0199
(16.731)**

14832.310

Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. The degree of significance is for a one-tailed test.
** Significant at the .01 level * Significant at the .05 level
BP Test is the Breusch-Pagan Test

Table lb. Generalized Least Squares Estimates Using Prais-Winsten Two-step
Estimators for: A = b0 + b,f(S - X) + b2g(T) + b3h(r) + £
Where Puts Are in-the-money and A < 0

b0

b,

b2

b3

BP Test

Last Trade Data
87 Observations

2.252
(3.831)**

0.059
(5.318)**

-0.004
(-2.071)*

-25.846
(-3.082)**

129.273

Last Quote Data
236 Observations

2.3548
(6.018)**

0.0439
(7.120)**

-0.0134
(-10.950)**

-27.746
(-4.656)**

208.966

All 117532
Observations

-0.7755
(-27.499)**

0.0578
(177.508)**

-0.0094
(-158.264)**

11.041
(22.366)**

14622.400

Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. The degree of significance is for a one-tailed test.
** Significant at the .01 level * Significant at the .05 level
BP Test is the Breusch-Pagan Test

As mentioned, heteroskedasticity is present in the random coefficients model.
To test this, a likelihood ratio test is performed between the null model, which does not
consider heteroskedasticity, and one that explicitly models the heterogeneity of the
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cross-sections.7 The likelihood ratio test simply tests whether there is a significant
difference between the maximized likelihood functions of the null and the restricted
models. The test is

-2[L(fy)-L(tyfd\ where L(fy) is the likelihood function of the

null model and L(ty0) is the same when explicitly modelling heterogeneity. This is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variable with (K-l) degrees of freedom. In
all cases, the null model is rejected in favor of the one modelling the heteroskedasticity.
A variable for volatility is included in the models estimated in Tables 2, 2a, and
2b, since this is one of the variables hypothesized to cause movements in options. The
results in Table 2a for the situation where calls are in-the-money indicate that the signs
o f the coefficients are as hypothesized except for the time variable. The reason we get
a negative coefficient can be explained. First, Fleming and Whaley (1995) find that the
wildcard option increases in value as a proportion of the index option with decreases in
time to maturity.

They explain that as the time value of the option decreases, the

wildcard value becomes more significant. The same should be happening here. In fact,
Harvey and Whaley (1992) find that the number of options exercised early increases
with decreases in the time to maturity. Therefore, the early exercise feature becomes
more valuable to investors as maturity approaches. This is what is found here, de Roon
and Veld (1995) do a similar study on DAX index options using OLS and find that their
coefficient on the time to maturity variable is also negative.

7Using SAS’s MIXED procedure, each cross-section, represented by five percentage
point increments of moneyness, is modeled with its own set of covariance parameters.

The moneyness coefficient is significant at the 5% level and of the correct sign.
As an option goes deeper in-the-money, the time value decreases as a proportion of the
option value. The value of the option approaches its intrinsic value, max(0, S-X), or the
exercise value. Therefore, the closer the option comes to its exercise value, the greater
the value of early exercise.
Table 2. Random Coefficient Model Estimates of
Ait = ft* + PmffS,, - X„) + P2itg(Tit) + P3ilh(ri() + P4ili(a it) + ui(
For Calls in-the-money and A > 0
All Data Are Included Except Where Dx > X( 1 - e'rT)

M
o

Mi

m2

m3

m4

Last Trade Data
Observations

0.8652
0.07}

0.0204
(4.70)**

0.0043
(4.57)**

-2.3785
(-0.47)

-3.4179
(-0.80)

Last Quote Data
Observations

1.0245
(2.33)**

0.0217
(6.76)**

-0.0006
(-0.77)

-8.0459
(-3.40)**

-1.3181
(-0.52)

5 minute
data

-1.0407
(-14.67)**

0.0013
0.19)

-0.0043
(-31.70)**

22.5911
(43.24)**

3.8484
(11.01)**

Numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic t-values. The degree of significance is for a onetailed test. ** Significant at the .01 level * Significant at the .05 level

Table 2a. Random Coefficient Model Estimates of
Aii = Poit + Pmf(s it - x n) + p2tig(Tit) + Piith(fit) + p4i.‘(<7it) + uit
For Calls in-the-money and A > 0
All Data Are Included
Mo

M,

M:

m3

M4

Last Trade Data
Observations

1.0109
(1.33)

0.0194
(4.84)**

0.0041
(4.71)**

-2.8854
(-0.61)

-3.9125
(-0.99)

Last Quote Data
Observations

3.3733
(8.64)**

0.0206
(6.82)**

0.0098
(16.89)**

-15.6470
(-17.77)**

-16.8481
(-7.03)**

5 minute
data

-0.8925
(-12.99)*'t

0.0019
(1.83)*

-0.0041
(-30.34)**

20.4776
(40.84)**

3.5691
(10.68)**

Numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic t-values. The degree of significance is for a one
tailed test. ** Significant at the .01 level * Significant at the .05 level
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Table 2b. Random Coefficient Model Estimates of
Ait = ft* + PiitfSi, - Xit) + p2ltg(Tlt) + p3ilh(rll) + P4lti(cru) + ui(
For Puts in-the-money and A < 0
*4
Last Trade Data
Observations

2.5229
(3.83)**

0.0382
(7.74)**

-0.0092
(-12.90)**

-4.8633
(-1.05)

-15.9696
(-5.15)**

Last Quote Data
Observations

0.4126
(0.31)

0.0077
(0.41)

-0.0123
(-4.50)**

-7.5883
(-1.60)

-4.2958
(-0.57)

5 minute
data

1.6947
(36.03)**

0.0378
(57.98)**

-0.0119
(-135.9)**

-0.1709
(-0.47)

-13.188
(-69.17)**

Numbers in parenthesis are asymptotic t-values. The degree of significance is for a one
tailed test. ** Significant at the .01 level * Significant at the .05 level

The sign on the interest rate coefficient is correct also. Since a call has a value
worth at least max(0, S-Xe'11), a higher interest rate will increase its value due to the
lower discounted strike price. Finally, the volatility is positively related to the value of
early exercise. The greater the volatility, the greater the probability the underlying
security will increase in value, hence a higher call price. For the case where the calls
are in-the-money but some have been exercised, we obtain similar results.
The estimates on puts-in-the-money also produce the correct signs.

Similar

reasoning as for calls can be made here to explain the signs. However, two points
should be kept in mind. First, the estimate of A is negative for puts in-the-money. And,
second, although the effect of movements in the riskless rate of return has the opposite
effect on puts, the effect on the probability of early exercise is positive. So, because we
have a negative A, the coefficient on the risk-free rate is and should be negative. This
differs from Table lb where the coefficient on the interest rate variable was positive for
the intraday data. However, here it is not significant. This is consistent with prior
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findings that, of the variables that influence options, the risk-free rate of interest has the
smallest effect. This leads us to conclude that the right to exercise early has movements
like traded options and should be considered as an option.
Also included in Tables 2, 2a, and 2b are the estimates using the closing data.
The coefficients and levels of significance in many cases are not what theory predicts.
However, one of the goals of this paper is to show that the use of nonsynchronous data
can cause problems. These estimates demonstrate that problems arise from using endof-day data even when a model has been found that gives consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimators.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that the value of early exercise is a
significant contributor to the Black-Scholes model in pricing American options. The
significant and positive intercepts are what theory predicts. The signs of the coefficients
are also as expected.

However, the same statistics over the three series are very

different. This is further evidence that nonsynchroneity can affect the results.

Table 3. Hsiao Random Coefficient Model Estimates of
[Abs(BS Call - Actual)]it = poit + J3Ut[Abs(BS Call + A - Actual)] + uit
Avg.Abs(BS Call Actual)

Avg. Abs(BS Call +
A • Actual)

Estimates

Last
Trade

1.297

0.527
t-values:

0.675 + 1.131b
11.13** 18.30**

Last
Quotes

1.444

0.437
t-values:

0.915 + 0.857b
22.81** 25.71**

5-min.
data

1.364

0.799
t-values:

0.341 + 1.027b
20.96** 1198.3**

** Significant at the .01 level

* Significant at the .05 level
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Table 4. Hsiao Random Coefficient Model Estimates of
[Abs(BS Put - Actual)]i( = P0it + Pht[Abs(BS Put + A - Actual)] + uit
Avg.Abs(BS Put Actual)

Avg. Abs(BS Put +
A - Actual)

Estimates

Last
Trade

1.320

0.455
t-values:

1.165 + 0.853b
17.43** 13.72**

Last
Quotes

1.446

0.519
t-values:

1.016 + 0.506b
8.26** 4.61**

5-min.
data

1.524

0.502
t-values:

1.571 + 0.998b
41.83** 1015.0**

** Significant at the .01 level

* Significant at the .05 level

The average prices in Tables 6 and 7 bear closer examination. For calls, the
average last prices are several dollars higher than the intraday prices. This is indicative
of the heavier volume of trading of options that are closer to the money. The last price
series give equal weight to each option series, so a far in-the-money option gets the
same weight on the average as an at-the-money option. The intraday data has more
trades in near-the-money options, hence the lower average price.

Table 5. Average Values of Calls and
the Estimated Value of Early Exercise
Avg. A

Avg. Call

Avg. B-S Call

Last Trade

0.776

16.99

15.70

Last Quotes

1.150

16.72

15.33

5-min. data

0.568

13.69

12.32
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Table 6. Average Values of Puts and
the Estimated Value of Early Exercise

1.6

Avg. A

Avg, Put

Avg. B-S Put

Last Trade

-1.104

11.68

10.37

Last Quotes

-1.227

14.01

12.67

5-min. data

-1.299

11.95

10.43

Chapter 1 Summary
Zivney’s paper showed that there is a value to early exercise. It is also found

in this analysis. The average values found here are different from those that Zivney
found.
He asserted and found that the value had movements that would be expected
from options. His results may have been obtained by chance, however. Both his choice
of ordinary least squares as an estimation technique and his selection of data consisting
of end-of-day observations are shown to produce spurious results.

A model that

explicitly incorporates cross-sectional and time series variability and gives efficient
estimators is used here. The movements that have been attributed to options in response
to movements in certain variables were found when using this technique. However, they
are not found when using ordinary least squares as Zivney did. Also, when the value
of early exercise is added to the Black Scholes option pricing model, a more accurate
pricing mechanism results. The most striking results show that not only do the tests
depend on the type of data (intraday or end-of-day), but also on the time series and
cross-sectional variability.

CHAPTER 2
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND RISK-FREE ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN
THE STANDARD AND POOR’S 100 INDEX OPTION MARKET
2.1

Literature Review
This section of the dissertation examines arbitrage opportunities in the OEX

market. Arbitrage opportunities occur in markets where investors can find strategies on
an unlimited scale, in theory, in which they can earn positive returns with zero net
investment. Arbitrage opportunities do not occur, however, in markets where prices
fully and instantaneously reflect all available relevant information (i.e., the market is
efficient).

Therefore, an investigation of the extent of arbitrage opportunities in a

market is, at the same time, an investigation of the efficiency of a market.
Arbitrage opportunities may develop in actual capital markets if various frictions
(taxes, short sale restrictions, non-divisibility of securities, costly information, etc.)
hinder the instantaneous flow of information to prices. However, the presence of these
frictions transforms riskless arbitrage into risky situations. For instance, the time it takes
to recognize an arbitrage opportunity, enter a market order9 to profit from the event,
and have the order filled might be enough time for prices to change and the opportunity
to pass. This is called immediacy risk. However, even if investors are risk averse,
some will have a competitive advantage over others with respect to dealing with these
frictions and still be able to identify and profit from potential arbitrage opportunities.

9A lim it order would also be risky, because there is the chance the order would not be filled.
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An example would be the cost and time advantages a market maker has over a private
individual investor.
An arbitrage opportunity may occur in an option market if an option’s market
price deviates from a model value. As long as the pricing model is correctly specified,
that option is said to be mispriced.

Arbitragers identify the mispricing and form

portfolios to earn arbitrage profits. The manner in which the portfolios are formed force
prices back to equilibrium.
However, these arbitrage opportunities differ according to the market.
Mispricings of equity options are generally thought not to last long, because arbitragers
can easily and quickly enter the stock and options markets and earn risk-free profits.
This action drives prices back towards equilibrium levels and implies a relatively high
degree of efficiency in these markets.
Due

to

various

idiosyncracies, however,

forces constraining

arbitrage

opportunities may not be as strong in the index options market. The problems revolve
around the apparent difficulties in forming arbitrage portfolios. For instance, index
options are written on a non-traded index, so arbitrage portfolios would need to include
either a short or long position in the securities making up the index in their exact
proportions. The index that is the subject of this paper, the Standard and Poor’s 100
Index, consists of one hundred different stocks. Therefore, the option is written on a
non-traded portfolio of 100 stocks. An arbitrage trade that could take advantage of and
correct a mispricing would be difficult to establish due to the difficulty in
instantaneously forming the portfolio of 100 stocks mentioned above. In the case where
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the arbitrage situation requires the investor to go long the underlying security, he would
have to purchase one hundred different securities simultaneously.

This would be

difficult but not impossible. However, the immediacy risk would be very high, and
prices would have to deviate substantially from equilibrium to entice investors into the
market, i.e., a high risk situation should promise the arbitrager a high expected return.
If the situation required shorting the index, the arbitrager would be required to short one
hundred stocks simultaneously on an up-tick. This is so improbable as to be impossible.
This is one example of a friction that can prevent index options from fully and
instantaneously reflecting all available information.
The same argument can be extended to a Black-Scholes world.

Black and

Scholes (1973) demonstrated that riskless returns could be earned by continuously
rebalancing a portfolio of calls and the underlying stock, as long as there are no large
price movements in the equity. If investors can continuously rebalance portfolios in the
exact proportions required by the Black-Scholes (1973) model, mispricings will not last
long, and the market will gain efficiency. The difficulty in this method lies in four
areas. First, it is not possible to continuously rebalance portfolios in practice.
Second, the correct ratio between options and shares or options and futures which
would allow the investor to capture risk-free returns may indicate the necessity to go
short or long a fractional share of the underlying security.9 For instance, Figlewski
(1989) points out that if the market value of the basket of stocks on which index options

gCox and Rubinstein (1985) show that rebalancings should be carried out through the underlying
security and not the option. This prevents the fluctuating call price from affecting the profit. For
instance, adjusting the hedge through the option may require the investor to purchase an overpriced option
o r write an underpriced one.
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are written is $500,000, and a Standard and Poor’s 500 future with a value of $140,000
is used as the proxy for the OEX in the hedge, then only when the hedge ratio is 0.28,
0.56, or 0.84 can a riskless hedge be carried out.
If the investor is using stocks and options, then a portfolio mimicking the index
would have to be formed. Using an argument similar to Harvey and Whaley (1992b),
if the market value of the stocks comprising the index is $42,000 and if IBM makes up
about 4% of the value, then the investor’s portfolio must contain $1680 of IBM. If the
price of IBM is $63, then the investor would have to purchase 26.67 shares for the
hedge portfolio, clearly an impossibility. The problem is exacerbated, because this
forces the investor to purchase an odd lot of shares. The odd lot transaction costs are
significantly greater than trading in round lots.

Thus, the riskless rate will not be

obtained.
Third, the transaction costs of continuous or repeated rebalancing would be
prohibitive. Because these large portfolio trades put a strain on the distribution system
and on specialists’ capital positions, according to Gastineau (1991), transactions costs
may increase and significantly affect the cost of the hedge. Phillips and Smith (1980)
studied the costs involved in these types of trades and determined that they could be
large enough to eradicate most arbitrage profits.
And, fourth, there is still the problem of trading large numbers of stocks
simultaneously. As mentioned above, it would be almost impossible to go short one
hundred stocks simultaneously. So, whether the arbitrage strategy involves periodically
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rebalancing a portfolio or a quick index arbitrage trade, various frictions may hamper
the efficiency of the index options market.
An important aspect of the arguments above centers on the question of how
rapidly traders can execute transactions involving large numbers of different securities.
Trading entire portfolios of stocks can be done as a form of program trading. Currently,
program trading can mean portfolio trading, index arbitrage, computerized trading (a
computer program generates buy and sell orders directly with no human interference),
and portfolio insurance.

Rubinstein (1989, p.29) defines program trading for the

purposes of his paper "as the simultaneous entry, but separate execution, of orders in
stocks in proportion to their relative representation in major indexes." The Wall Street
Journal (for instance, see the July 8, 1994 issue, p. C6) defines the expression in its
weekly segment, "Program Trading," as the "simultaneous purchase or sale of at least
15 different stocks with a total value of $1 million or more." The common denominator
among the definitions is that program trading entails the buying or selling of portfolios
o f stocks rather than individual stocks. This reduces some of the non-simultaneous
problem and, hence, lessens the risk of the trader missing the arbitrage profit, if there
is one.
In fact, Stoll (1988) contends that most program or portfolio trading is executed
in small units through the New York Stock Exchange Designated Order Turnaround
system (DOT). DOT is an order-entry system constructed to send small orders to the
appropriate specialist.

The SuperDot system has followed and was able to handle
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market orders of up to 2099 shares in 1986.10 Therefore, the portfolio trade is broken
up among many specialists and is executed, usually, as a market order and may not
capture the prices required to earn risk-free profits. In addition, each trading firm must
maintain a separate line to the trading floor for portfolio trades. This separate line
allows exchange officials to inhibit program trading and give retail trades an opportunity
to be executed in case program trades completely dominate the market. This feature has
never been used, but it adds another dimension of risk for the index arbitrager.
However, the problem remains that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
simultaneously trade 100 stocks in the exact proportions as the index would require. So,
while pressures can develop to push the index and index option prices away from
equilibrium, the arbitrage forces which should keep index option prices in equilibrium
seem to be weaker than in the case of individual equity options. This means that the
flow of information between markets is impeded, and efficiency is hindered.

The

purpose of this study will be to address the issue of whether or not the Standard and
Poor’s 100 Index option is efficiently priced and, if it is not, whether there is some
mechanism that can drive the prices toward equilibrium.
One mechanism that is examined is an arbitrage portfolio of a call, a put, a
discount bond, and a synthetic index, rather than a synthetic option, as in portfolio
insurance. The synthetic index would be constructed from another set of puts, calls, and
discount bond whose payoff structure matches the payoff of the index. For instance, if
the mispricing requires a short position in the underlying security, this position could

"'In September, 1989, the SuperDot system was upgraded to handle post-opening orders o f up to
30,099 shares.
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be mimicked by writing a call, buying a put, and borrowing an amount equivalent to the
discounted strike price. Rebalancing would not be required to earn a riskless return.
It would be necessary, though, that the options making up the synthetic index be priced
correctly or better (i.e., the purchased option could be underpriced or the written option
could be overpriced).
This is the so-called box-spread. It is used here because it does not rely on any
particular model and its assumptions. To identify the mispriced options for use in
forming arbitrage portfolios, put-call parity boundaries, the binomial option pricing
model, the Black-Scholes option pricing model, and the Black-Scholes option pricing
model plus the estimated value of early exercise will be used as benchmarks.
Also examined will be portfolios using S&P 500 futures and subsets of the OEX
to mimic the S&P 100 index. While the literature states that these portfolios are used
by actual traders, there are no studies relating portfolios of OEX options and SPX
futures or OEX options and subsets of the index to arbitrage portfolios.

Arbitrage

portfolios will be constructed with the relevant costs taken into account. Profits, if any,
will be determined.
Recently, a new security has been introduced. These are Standard and Poor’s
Depository Receipts (SPDRs). They are unit investment trusts which contain the SPX
basket of stocks and are traded on the American Stock Exchange. Although they were
not traded during the time period of this study, it could be argued that they can be used
as part of an arbitrage portfolio with the OEX options. However, in conversations with
an OEX option trader, these were not mentioned, although there is no reason they could
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not be used. The trader did acknowledge that other options and the SPX futures were
commonly used to form the arbitrage portfolios though.11
The next section examines how previous researchers have seen the problem. The
section following that will outline the methodology. Subsequently, the data description
and results are provided.
Previous studies have examined the efficiency of the Standard and Poor’s 100
Index option market of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). For instance,
in an early study of the efficiency of the OEX market, Evnine and Rudd (1985) test the
OEX and the Major Market Index options against arbitrage boundaries, put-call parity,
and binomial option pricing model theoretical values. They show that the index options
are often mispriced and attribute the mispricings to the difficulty in forming arbitrage
portfolios.
While Evnine and Rudd (1985) use intraday bid-ask data, Chance (1988)
employs closing bid-ask prices of the OEX and finds that violations of boundary
conditions are rare.

On closer examination of the two studies’ only common test,

however, both find violations of the lower boundary condition (Cu - I + K > 0 for
Evnine and Rudd and Cu + Ke_lT - Ie DT for Chance) in about 2.5% of their data. The
r

use of intraday data in the Evnine and Rudd study and end of the day data by Chance
could be the cause of the difference in their overall conclusions about the efficiency of
the OEX market. In fact, Evnine and Rudd mention that they obtained different results

n The SPD R ’s volume is still low relative to the SPX futures. Therefore, arbitragers would more
likely use the SPX futures for price discovery and forming arbitrage portfolios. Also, the futures would
reflect any changes in the composition o f the SPX index, while a unit investment trust does not change
its com position except for liquidating various holdings.

when using closing prices in an earlier study (Evnine and Rudd, 1983). Sheikh (1991)
discovers that the market values of OEX options are different from values produced by
the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model by using a methodology very similar to
Rubinstein (1985). Diz and Finucane (1993) find inefficiencies in the OEX market
relative to early exercise decisions. They find that investors sometimes exercise early
even when the value of this decision is less than the value they could have received if
the option were sold. The major problem, as mentioned above, is that mispricings
cannot be arbitraged away easily with an index option due to the non-tradeable status
of the underlying security. In fact, the studies mentioned above use actual index values
in their analyses even though such a security does not exist.

Various authors have

suggested proxies for the index.
Evnine and Rudd (1985) suggest that traders construct proxy portfolios consisting
of several highly liquid stocks appropriately weighted to closely match the index. Also
mentioned is that futures on the S&P 500 Index (SPX) are sometimes used to proxy for
the S&P 100 Index. Fleming and Whaley (1994), also, assert that traders use the S&P
500 futures returns to value OEX options.

However, the use of these or any other

proxies introduces risk from the imperfect correlation between the index proxy and the
S&P 100. This risk prevents the formation of riskless arbitrage portfolios and permits
the existence of pricing errors.
To illustrate, using the analysis from Evnine and Rudd (1985), if C, and /, are
the price of the call and index at time t, then an investor can attempt to profit from
overpricing of the call by forming a riskless hedge portfolio consisting of a long position
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in the index and a written call. The investor would have to use a proxy for the index,
P,, such that P, = /, for all t. In reality, this condition can only hold for a moment, so
the relationship becomes, at some time T, PT = IT + er, where er is the size of the
tracking error. If the hedge ratio is A, then the investor can look forward to a profit
over the time period [t, T\ of:
( A PT - CT) - ( A P c - Ct )

- ( A I T + A eT - [ £?r + u r ] ) - ( A J t - [ <?c + u c] )

= [ (A l T - CT) - (A i t - Ct ) ] + A e r - u T + u t

(1 4 )

where C is the option’s theoretical price, and the pricing error between the market value
and the theoretical value of the call is u, = C, - CT. The term in brackets after the
second equality represents the risk-free return on an arbitrage between a correctly priced
option and the index, u, is the mispricing that investors initially identify and try to take
advantage of through arbitrage.

uT is the mispricing when the hedge is unwound.

Evnine and Rudd assume it can be neglected if the hedge is continuously rebalanced.
AeT is the remaining risk and may not disappear. Therefore, risk-free arbitrage may not
be possible, and pricing errors may remain.
On the other hand, Chen and Johnson (1985) demonstrate that the underlying
security does not have to be part of the hedge portfolio. Chen and Johnson (1985)
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assert that a hedge can be constructed with only options. If a mispricing requires a
hedge of a short position of n l units of option c l and a long position of one share of
stock, for instance, investors may also be able to find a hedge on the same stock of
going long n2 units of option c2 and shorting one share of the stock. The hedge ratio
becomes -nl/n2, and the stock is netted out. The strategy is to adjust the hedge by
buying the underpriced option and selling the overpriced one. Thus, an option-option
hedge is created, and the underlying security need not be held. Continuous rebalancing
is still required, and fractional units of options are still assumed to be available for risk
free hedges, assumptions that do not hold in real options markets.
The next section will demonstrate how risk-free arbitrage portfolios can be
constructed using instruments that are available to market participants. Included will be
a portfolio comprised of only options and a discount bond. This will curtail the need
for periodic rebalancing.

2.2

Method of Analysis
The empirical problems with arbitrage involving an index option are that the

portfolios require periodic rebalancing, trading in fractional units, and the simultaneous
trading of a large number of securities. This adds to the cost and requires constant
supervision by the investor. Several alternatives will be examined here which might
mitigate these problems. The alternatives include a synthetic index composed of options
and a risk-free bond, the S&P 500 futures contract, and small portfolios of equities to
mimic the index.
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2.2.1

Synthetic Index
A method to test for efficiency without the need for continuous portfolio

rebalancing would be to construct a synthetic index with options and a discount bond,
and use this portfolio in conjunction with the mispriced option to produce a risk-free
arbitrage portfolio.

Of course, this presumes that the entire market is not out of

equilibrium at the same time. That is, the options used to construct the synthetic index
should be, at least, properly priced.
The main difficulty with an index option lies in the fact that the put can become
overvalued relative to the call. Then an arbitrageur would write the put, buy the call,
lend an amount equal to the discounted strike price, and short the index to generate
riskless returns. It is the last input that causes problems. However, an investor could
write a call, buy a put, and borrow an amount equal to the discounted strike price to
produce a payoff pattern identical with the index and remain consistent with put-call
parity.
Because we assume something cannot be created from nothing, the initial cost
should be positive:

CB -

+ PBI

-

p w -

Kz* ~ rt

+

>

0

<1 5 >

where Pw is the price of the written put, CB is the price of the purchased call, K2e'rl is
the amount borrowed as part of the index proxy portfolio, K ,e r' is the amount loaned
at the strike price of the mispriced option, and CWI and Pb, are the respective prices of
the written call and purchased put comprising the index. If there are no frictions in the
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market, this would be a strict equality, and the ending payoffs would be zero. In other
words, an investment that has zero cost has a zero return. This is illustrated in Table
7 where the index proxy portfolio is formed at a higher strike price. However, the
initial cost may empirically be found to be non-positive due to mispricing, and the
ending payoffs to be positive.
Table 7 indicates that there are three possible states of the world at maturity.
The price o f the index can be below the lower strike price, it can be above the higher
strike price, or it can be between the two strike prices. No matter which state occurs,
if put-call parity holds, the value of the portfolio will be zero at maturity. Therefore,
there is no uncertainty, no cost, and no payoff.
Table 7. Final Payoffs for an Option Arbitrage With a Written Call, Purchased
Put, and an Amount Borrowed Proxying for the Shorted Underlying Security
S < K,

K, < S < K2

S - K,

0

0

V'B

0

S - K,

S - K,

-K^e"

K,

K,

K,

Qvi
p

0

0

K2 - S

r Bt

k2 - s

K2 - S

0

K2e'rt

-k 2

-k 2

-k 2

0

0

0

Ending Possibilities:
Ki

^2

Pw
p

Ending Payoffs:

S>

k2

S = end o f period price of underlying security, K, = strike price of mispriced option, K2 = strike
price of index proxy which is assumed to be greater than K,, Pw = written put, C B = purchased
call, Cw, = written call, and PBI = purchased put.

There are three benefits to forming the arbitrage portfolio this way. First, it does
not have to be continually rebalanced. Investors know the initial cost and the minimum
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ending payoff. There are no additional costs from continual rebalancing or monitoring.
The investor would enter into the relationship only if the ending payoff is positive or
the initial cost is negative. Second, this will help force the mispriced options back to
an equilibrium level. The price of an overpriced put will be forced down, and the price
of an underpriced call will be forced up. And, third, there is no problem with a hedge
ratio demanding fractional share or option positions to be undertaken.
An argument against this portfolio is that the written put or the written call may
be exercised before maturity. However, this will not affect the risk of the situation.
This can be shown whether the arbitrager receives notice of the exercise immediately
or not. For instance, consider the written call at the higher strike price. It will not be
exercised unless S > K2.

If this condition occurs, and the arbitrager is notified

immediately of the exercise, the writer will have to provide the difference between the
index value and the strike price. Instead, however, the investor can exercise the call he
holds at the lower strike price to offset this transaction. The payoff will be -(S - K2)
+ (S - Kj) or K2 - Kj. The puts at this point are out-of-the-money and would not be
exercised. However, if the price of the index subsequently dropped below K,, and if the
put at the lower strike price were exercised, then the payoff would be -(K, - S) + (K2 S) = K2 - Kh again.
Unfortunately, the actual trader on the CBOE is notified of the exercise the next
day, not immediately. To account for this, the arbitrager would assess the probability
of early exercise each day in the wildcard period. If the price of Cw < S - K2, then he
assumes his option will be exercised. He, therefore, exercises his call at the lower strike
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price early. He receives S - K, for his exercise and purchases an offsetting option at the
higher strike price to close out that position. This will provide an additional profit,
because the price of the new call purchased will be less than the amount above K2 the
arbitrager receives upon exercising his option. If the cost of the new call is (S - K2)
minus e, where e > 0, then his payoff will be,
■((S - K2) - e) + (S - K t) = K2 - K, + e > K2 - K,.

(16)

Since the initial criteria for setting up this arbitrage portfolio was that it must be risk
free and that K2 - K, must be greater than or equal to the risk-free return, the arbitrager
earns an even greater profit.

A similar argument can be made for the put being

exercised early.

2.2.2

Futures
Fleming and Whaley (1994) assert that the return stream from the S&P 500

future is more correlated with the OEX than the S&P 100 Index is with the OEX. In
fact, they state, "traders use the S&P 500 futures rather than the reported S&P 100 index
level to value OEX options" (Fleming and Whaley, 1994, p.230). A simple correlation
analysis is made of the OEX cash index, the cash SPX index, and the SPX futures.
Three series are formed representing 17,368 observations of each at five minute
intervals. The OEX data is from the Berkeley Options tapes, and the SPX data comes
from the Tick Data Corporation.

These series are used in the third part of this

dissertation, except that an adjustment is made to the futures data at that point. The
returns of the respective instruments are also analyzed here. As can be seen in Table
8, the OEX, SPX, and SPX future are all highly correlated. However, in Table 9 it can
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be seen that there is less of a linear relationship between the returns. But, they are still
highly significant. Therefore, an analysis incorporating the S&P 500 future rather than
the call-put-bond index proxy is executed. Arbitrage profits are identified and recorded.
Table 8. Correlation Analysis of the OEX, SPX, and SPX Future

Cash OEX

Cash OEX

Cash SPX

SPX Future

1.0000

0.98853

0.98859

(0.0000)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

1.0000

0.99789

(0.0000)

(0.0001)

Cash SPX

1.0000
SPX Future

(0.0000)
Numbers in parentheses are P-values.

Table 9. Correlation Analysis of the OEX, SPX, and SPX Futures Returns

Cash OEX
Returns
Cash SPX
Returns

Cash OEX Returns

Cash SPX Returns

SPX Futures Returns

1.0000

0.86343

0.58580

(0.0000)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

1.0000

0.62728

(0.0000)

(0.0001)
1.0000

SPX Futures
Returns

(0.0000)
Numbers in parentheses are P-values.

The problem is in determining the adjustment to the SPX futures price to use in
pricing the OEX options, since the S&P 100 and S&P 500 Indexes are not perfectly
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correlated. We can construct a simulated S&P 100 Index in the following manner by
regressing the OEX cash index on the discounted SPX future as follows:

(17)

This gives us the predicted value of the S&P 100 index, which can now be used in putcall parity or other pricing relationships. In fact, the regression is run each day. Those
parameters from the model are then used with the following day’s SPX futures to price
the OEX options.

2.2.3

Stock Portfolios
Evnine and Rudd (1985) suggest using portfolios of several stocks to proxy for

the S&P 100 cash index. Proxy portfolios can be selected by minimizing the return
errors between various subsets of the OEX and the total OEX.
There are several criteria in finding a mimicking portfolio for the OEX. First,
as few stocks as possible should be chosen. This reduces costs as well as alleviating
the difficulty in purchasing or shorting one hundred stocks simultaneously. And second,
the difference between the returns from the mimicking portfolio and the index portfolio
should be minimized. Since the goal is to find the optimal portfolio subject to several
criteria, a genetic algorithm12 was chosen to generate the portfolio.
A genetic algorithm is a global optimization technique. It relies on the laws of
probability, as well as a preference for better performing solutions, to search over a

l2For a description o f genetic algorithms and applications in finance, see Grace (1994).
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population of potential solutions to a problem simultaneously. The potential solutions
are modeled as binary strings for computational efficiency.

Most other techniques

search over one potential solution at a time. In this case, the search is for a set of
weights ranging between zero and one for one hundred different stocks, given the above
criteria. In using the genetic algorithm to select the optimal set of stocks to mimic the
OEX, a population of potential solutions composed of 400 binary strings, each 2000
digits long is generated.

The 2000 binary digits decodes into 100 weights.

Two

thousand five hundred generations or iterations are run.
Short sale restrictions are taken into account by shorting only on an uptick.
When the stocks are bought or sold, I use the appropriate bid-ask quotes.

2.2.4

Transactions Costs
Any study of market efficiency that does not take into account transactions costs

can be misleading. Where it may appear that arbitrage profits are available, including
a realistic set of costs may cause those positive profits to disappear.
To estimate the relevant costs, Phillips and Smith (1986) separately examine the
cost structure of market makers on the floor of the options exchange and members of
brokerage firms who specialize in arbitrage trades involving stocks and options.
Although the latter group is in the most favorable position cost-wise to trade a portfolio
of options and stocks judging by their Table 1, the market maker would be able to
capture mispriced options more rapidly. Unless otherwise specified, the term arbitrager
will refer to either type of trader.
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Phillips and Smith (1980) identify explicit and implicit costs. Explicit costs
would entail items such as commissions and SEC transactions fees. Implicit costs are
found in the bid-ask spread. For instance, the market maker will charge a higher price
to sell his inventory (the ask price) than to buy (the bid price) more inventory. Since
bid-ask prices are being used here, this cost should not be a factor in the analysis.
However, it should be remembered that a quote for an OEX option is good for only 10
options, and a quote on a stock is valid for only 100 shares.
Phillips and Smith (1980) list the explicit costs for an options market maker to
range from about $6.00 to $20.00 per trade for stock and option portfolios: $0.50 to
$1.00 per option contract and $5.00 to $12.50 per round lot of stock. In addition, there
would be various fees and taxes that might add up to $6.50 per trade. For an arbitrager
employed by a brokerage firm with exchange memberships, these fees could range
between $2.50 and $12.00. The relatively large difference in fees is due to the fact that
the market maker must contract with another party to effect his stock transaction.
More recently, Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley [FOW] (1995) give the
commission for trading OEX options to be $2.40 per contract. This is used in this
paper. FOW also suggest a commission of $0.02 per share of stock. Phillips and Smith
find the stock commission to vary between $0.01 and $0.04 per share. I take the FOW
figure, since it is more recent.
Unfortunately, bid-ask prices are not available for the futures data (described
below). Therefore, the implicit cost of the trade represented by the spread must be
estimated. FOW give an average bid-ask spread for the nearby SPX future as $27.90.
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Lee and Nayar [LN] (1993) give $12.50 as one half of the bid-ask spread or one-way
transaction cost. The explicit commissions on futures is found by LN to be $20 round
trip for institutional investors and $10 for member firms. FOW find the figure to be
slightly higher. Therefore, I use a cost of one half the bid-ask spread ($13.95) and the
commission ($6.00) from FOW to be conservative for a total of $19.95 per futures trade.
Since it takes 5 option contracts to equal one futures contract,13 the total cost of this
trade is $43.95. For instance, with a trade involving put-call-futures parity, five calls,
five puts, and one future are traded. The next section will describe the data.

2.3

Data
The OEX option data for 1986 comes from the Berkeley option tapes. It consists

of second by second bid-ask quotes. The first half hour of trading was deleted because
of the thinness of trading at this time. Any set of quotes where either the bid or the ask
was zero was also removed. This left 1,085,506 records, where each record consisted
of the date, time of the quote, maturity, strike price, bid price, ask price, and index
value.

The risk-free rate was proxied by the rate on the treasury bill that matured

closest to the maturity of the option and was obtained from the Wall Street Journal.
The intraday data for the S&P 500 futures came from the Tick Data Corporation.
As mentioned above, these are actual transaction prices. Trades occur between the
hours of 8:30 A.M. and 3:15 P.M. Central Time on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
The futures expire on the third Friday of March, June, September, and December. The
time period in question is 1986.

l3T he dollar value o f the OEX is one hundred times the index, and the dollar value o f the SPX is 500
tim es the future.
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An issue is that the only month that has good liquidity is the current expiration
month.

Therefore, it is assumed that arbitragers value liquidity, and only arbitrage

trades involving the future nearest to expiration will be examined. For example, from
January 2nd through the third Friday of March, only arbitrage trades affecting March
expiration futures and options will be investigated. The following week, only futures
and options having a June expiration will meet the criteria.
Bid-ask quotes on the relevant stocks for the proxy portfolios were obtained from
the ISSM tapes. The composition of the OEX changed several times during 1986, and
those changes are incorporated here. On June 11th, RCA was dropped and Bell Atlantic
was added.

Several changes occurred on September 17th.

Sperry merged with

Burroughs to form Unisys. Also, Ameritech was added, finally, on November 26th,
Safeway Stores was supplanted by H.J. Heinz.
To find the weights for the mimicking portfolios, I take the last quotes in a one
hour period for each stock in the OEX. The data is gathered over one week periods.
Hourly returns are constructed along with hourly returns from the OEX. This data is
fed into the genetic algorithm where the sum of squared errors is minimized between
the two series subject to a penalty for each weight greater than zero. These weights are
then used in the following week to develop mimicking portfolios.
The mimicking portfolio is designed to replicate the performance of the
underlying index. Perfect replication would be optimal, but is probably not possible
from a practical standpoint. However, this brings up the point that the purpose of the
replicating portfolio is to substitute for the larger basket of index stocks, thus lowering

59
transactions costs and immediacy risk. Also, the purpose of the mimicking portfolio is
not to replace the index value in identifying arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, the
actual index value is used to identify trading opportunities, and then the arbitrage
portfolios are formed with the mimicking portfolios.
The dividend yield on the SPX used in regressing the OEX on the discounted
future came from Standard and Poor’s Analysts' Handbook, 1994 Annual Edition. With
a dividend per share of 8.28 and an average SPX price during 1986 of 228.745, the
annual yield was .0362. Dividends on the OEX are from Harvey and Whaley (1992a).
Results and the specifics of the tests are given next.

2.4

Tests
Arbitrage opportunities are searched for with respect to violations of put-call

parity boundaries, Black-Scholes option prices, Black-Scholes option prices plus the
value of early exercise, and binomial option prices. If mispricings are found, a proxy
index is formed to help capture the arbitrage profit.

2.4.1

American Boundaries
Any violation of option boundaries permits risk-free arbitrage profits.

boundaries for an American option are:
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where Cf„ is the call ask, Chl is the call bid, Put is the put ask, and P,„ is the put bid. A
violation of the first equation indicates either an over-priced call or an under-priced put.
A violation of the second equation implies the opposite. Since the investor knows all
option prices (he may be a floor trader), he can pick those trades which are profitable
and reject those which are not. I look only at those trades that a trader would identify
as being profitable even though many other options may be identified as being
mispriced.
For the box spread, I assume the investor looks for options that violate the putcall parity relationship outlined above. The cash index value is used in the equation.
Once a violation is found, the arbitrager looks for options to complete the box. If he
finds them, a trade is recorded using all the appropriate figures. If he does not find a
complete box, he waits for another violation.
As can be seen from Table 10, the number of profitable arbitrage trades
generated is relatively small. Of the total number of options examined, only about
1.25% are found to be mispriced and produce profitable arbitrage trades. What should
be noted is that, first, although it was hypothesized that overpriced puts would cause the
most frequent occurrence of mispricings, the culprit here is overpriced calls. Second,
the mispricings are due almost exclusively to overpriced options relative to the
boundaries.
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Using the SPX futures to proxy for the index value, many more mispricings are
found. However, this amounts to only about 11.35% of the options. The arbitrage
trades are spread more evenly among the type of mispricings.
Finally, the stock portfolios find about 5% of the options to be mispriced.
However, here the actual index value is used in the inequalities to find the mispricing.
The mimicking portfolio is then substituted to find the profit. Since the value of the
portfolio may deviate from the value of index, the investor cannot be assured that the
trade will be profitable on initiating it. So, here I assume that the arbitrager tries to
capture all mispricings.

The average profit turns out to be negative.

As in each

category, most of the mispricings are due to overpriced calls.
When adjusting the futures trades for implicit and explicit costs, the most
noticeable phenomenon is that the number of profitable opportunities drops 94% to 7400
for the futures proxy. Notice also that these are net profits. So, even though five calls
and five puts are being traded with the future, it is only necessary to multiply the box
trade profit by five to get a comparable figure. The mispricing is skewed towards
underpriced puts.
It should be noted that the average time for a short sale to be completed for the
stocks is four minutes and twenty-two seconds for the no-cost trades and four minutes
and fifty-eight seconds for the costly trades. This length of time may render the trades
to be too risky for arbitagers.

Table 10. Arbitrage Trades Generated by American Boundary Violations
Cost = $0.0
Type of Index
Proxy

Number Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent Calls - Percent Puts - Percent Puts - Percent
$ Profit $ Profit $ Profit
Underpriced
Overpriced
of
Underpriced
Overpriced
Trades
13,558

13.074

0.001

45.081

0.767

0.002

0.230

0.000

S&P 500 Future 123,218

13.192

0.002

223.45

0.336

0.124

0.289

0.251

77.552

0.995

0.000

0.005

0.000

Options

Stocks

50,128 -111.802 -214.529

Table 11. Arbitrage Trades Generated by American Boundary Violations
Cost = $2.40 per Option, $19.95 per Future, $0.02 per Share
Type of Index
Proxy

Number Average Minumum Maximum Calls - Percent
of Trades $ Profit $ Profit
$ Profit
Overpriced

Calls Puts - Percent Puts - Percent
Percent
Overpriced Underpriced
Underpriced

Options

8,619

7.894

0.0002

35.480

0.649

0.003

0.348

0.000

S&P 500 Future

7400

22.823

0.0002

179.500

0.082

0.000

0.098

0.819

-325.070

-33.500

0.995

0.000

0.005

0.000

Stocks

50,128 ■218.468
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2.4.2

Black-Scholes Model Prices
The Black-Scholes option pricing model is specified for European style options

on non-dividend paying individual stocks. Therefore, it would not be surprising to find
OEX market prices deviating from model prices.

In this test, market prices are

compared to model prices. If a call (put) bid price is greater than the Black-Scholes
price, then an overpriced call (put) is identified. If a call (put) ask price is less than the
Black-Scholes price, then an underpriced call (put) is identified.

If one of these

deviations is found, a portfolio is formed with a synthetic index, and potential profits
are investigated. Dividends are accounted for by subtracting the present value of all
dividends to be paid between the current date and the option’s maturity from the stock
price. This adjusted stock price is used in the Black-Scholes formula.
Table 12 indicates that the majority of mispricings are concentrated among the
overpriced puts and underpriced calls. This is more in line with the original hypothesis.
Once again, on average, the stock portfolios produce losses. In fact, the average time
to form the short-sale portfolios increases here to over seven minutes for both types of
trades.

2.4.3

Black-Scholes Plus the Value of Early Exercise
The Black-Scholes model plus a correction for early exercise is examined.

In

the first section of this dissertation, the estimated average value of early exercise for
calls in-the-money is found to be 4.1 percent and for puts it is 10.87 percent.
Regressions were also run on the estimated value of early exercise as the dependent
variable and moneyness, time to expiration, and the risk-free interest rate as the
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dependent variables. The coefficients that were found are used here with the degree of
moneyness, time to expiration, and risk-free rate associated with each option to find an
estimated value of early exercise for each option. It should be noted that the regressions
were run on options in-the-money, but the coefficients are being applied to all options.
Mispricings are searched for relative to a benchmark made up of the Black-Scholes
model value plus this estimated value of early exercise.
Comparing Tables 12 and 14, the number of arbitrage opportunities identified for
the box spread and the stock portfolios is reduced dramatically. In fact, the potential
profits increase when the early exercise feature is included. However, the number of
trades identified using the futures increases. The mispricings lean heavily towards the
underpriced puts.
The time to form the short-sale portfolios increases significantly. Over fifteen
minutes are required to complete the transaction.

2.4.4

Binomial Option Pricing Model
Finally, a binomial option pricing model that explicitly takes into account the

probability of early exercise is used to search for mispriced options.

Arbitrage

portfolios are, once again, formed. The construction of the binomial option pricing
model for index options demands a short explanation.
In using the binomial option pricing model for index options, the dividend enters
into the problem in two ways. First, the index price must be adjusted to account for the
discounted stream of dividends between the current date and the option’s maturity. In
other words, the index tree is generated using this adjusted index value.

Table 12. Arbitrage Trades Generated by the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model
Cost = $0.0
Type of Index Number of Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent
$ Profit
Overpriced
Proxy
Trades $ Profit $ Profit

Puts - Percent Puts - Percent
Calls Percent
Overpriced
Underpriced
Underpriced

Options

73,167

9.911

0.001

58.356

0.099

0.357

0.338

0.207

S&P 500 Future

164,472

7.803

0.01

66.201

0.202

0.437

0.143

0.218

Stocks

356,694

190.774

0.526

0.000

0.396

0.077

-18.408 -202.505

Table 13. Arbitrage Trades Generated by the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model
Cost = $2.40 per Option, $19.95 per Future, $0.02 per Share
Type of Index Number of Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent Calls - Percent Puts - Percent Puts - Percent
$ Profit
Trades $ Profit $ Profit
Overpriced
Overpriced
Proxy
Underpriced
Underpriced
Options

16,283

6.492

0.002

33.990

0.103

0.640

0.027

0.230

S&P 500 Future

3027

6.853

0.002

33.990

0.000

0.000

0.183

0.817

Stocks

356,694

78.889

0.526

0.000

0.396

0.077

-92.828 -313.426

o\
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The dividends enter into the model again when forming the option tree. Since
the tree for the options starts at the end of the option’s life, those option values
represent the intrinsic value of the option.

One period prior to the maturity of the

option, the option’s value is the present value of the future values of the option.
However, since this is an American option, a check must be made to see if the option’s
value at that node is less than the value if exercised. This is done by comparing the
option (call) value with the adjusted index price plus the discounted value of dividends
between that time period and the option’s maturity minus the strike price.

If the

exercise value is greater than the option value, the exercise value is substituted onto that
node. This is the method recommended in Harvey and Whaley (1992a and 1992b) and
used here. The number of time periods for the binomial tree is set at twice the number
of days until the option’s maturity, as in Harvey and Whaley (1992a and 1992b).
For this case, the overpriced puts represent the greatest occurrence of mispricings
in each category as was hypothesized. Also noteworthy is that this method generates
the largest profits for the stock portfolios, but the number of profitable opportunities for
the futures drops drastically when costs are included. An arbitrager needs over seven
minutes on average to short sell all of the stocks required to form the portfolios.

2.5

Chapter 2 Summary
These results indicate that the S&P 100 Index option market is relatively

efficient. For instance, Evnine and Rudd (1985) found approximately 16% of their
sample violating American boundary conditions. Only about 1.25% are found here.
However, like their study, most of the mispricings tend to be overpriced calls.

Table 14. Arbitrage Trades Generated by the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model Plus the Estimate Value of Early
Exercise, Cost = $0.0
Type of Index Number of Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent
Overpriced
$ Profit
Proxy
Trades $ Profit $ Profit

C allsPuts - Percent Puts - Percent
Percent
Overpriced
Underpriced
Underpriced

Options

29,390

15.341

1.299

41.085

0.059

0.0005

0.444

0.497

S&P 500 Future

208,989

12.953

0.051

87.451

0.159

0.344

0.154

0.343

Stocks

39,026

-2.619 -133.319

127.099

0.000

0.000

0.502

0.498

Table 15. Arbitrage Trades Generated by the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model Plus the Estimate Value of Early
Exercise, Cost = $2.40 per Option, $19.95, $0.02 per Share
Type of Index Number of Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent
Overpriced
Proxy
Trades $ Profit $ Profit
$ Profit

C allsPuts - Percent Puts - Percent
Percent
Underpriced
Overpriced
Underpriced

Options

21,787

7.904

0.004

31.485

0.011

0.001

0.490

0.499

S&P 500 Future

13,911

9.826

0.002

43.501

0.000

0.000

0.056

0.944

Stocks

39,026

15.324

0.000

0.000

0.502

0.498

114.735 -244.644

Table 16. Arbitrage Trades Generated by the Binomial Option Pricing Model
Cost = $0.0
Type of Index Number of Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent Calls - Percent Puts - Percent Puts - Percent
$ Profit
Overpriced
Trades $ Profit $ Profit
Underpriced
Proxy
Overpriced
Underpriced
Options

36,631

14.118

1.299

41.085

0.067

0.000

0.933

0.000

S&P 500 Future

84,800

10.606

0.139

223.45

0.483

0.000

0.517

0.000

Stocks

62,478

186.845

0.011

0.000

0.989

0.000

107.029 -198.366

Table 17. Arbitrage Trades Generated by the Binomial Option Pricing Model
Cost = $2.40 per Option, $19.95, $0.02 per Share
Type of Index Number of Average Minimum Maximum Calls - Percent Calls - Percent Puts - Percent Puts - Percent
$ Profit
Overpriced
Underpriced
Overpriced
Trades $ Profit $ Profit
Proxy
Underpriced
Options

25,442

6.707

0.003

31.485

0.010

0.000

0.990

0.000

S&P 500 Future

1,864

92.051

0.002

179.501

0.327

0.000

0.673

0.000

Stocks

62,478

75.028

0.011

0.000

0.989

0.000

-5.230 -308.403

o\
00
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FOW have examined the lead-lag relationships among index markets and found
that the cost of doing business in a particular market can affect the price discovery
process. Costs are also relevant here, judging by the number of profitable trades and
the net profit in each category. With no costs, the profit for trades generated by all
models is $6,515,290.00 for the futures proxy and $1,870,444.00 for the options proxy.
However, when costs are included, the options proxy has the greater profit over the
futures proxy: $516,591.60 versus $497,906.80. The price discovery process will be
further examined in the next section of the dissertation.
In general, the number of mispricings found is low relative to the total number
of options examined. Additionally, even though it was hypothesized that a large number
of mispricings would be due to overpriced puts, the actual mispricings did not
concentrate here. It is also shown that there may be too much risk in trying to capture
an arbitrage profit by using a small mimicking stock portfolio to proxy for the entire
basket of index stocks. Future research is indicated in this area; i.e., how large does a
mispricing have to be before an arbitrager is assured of a positive average profit? Also,
future research should look for concentrations of arbitrage opportunities in particular
periods, such as expiration week. Finally, relationships between arbitrage opportunities
and moneyness and time to maturity should be examined.
As indicated above, one impediment to forming arbitrage portfolios is the
necesity to wait for an uptick. The amount of time to form the short-sale portfolios
where needed is found to range from just over two minutes to over fifteen minutes on
average. This is probably too risky for investors.

CHAPTER 3
PRICE DISCOVERY AND INDEX OPTIONS
3.1

Literature Review
One of the central themes of this paper is that there is no single traded security

underlying index options. However, this may not be an insurmountable problem. For
instance, for valuation purposes there are several proxies, as outlined previously. Also,
the non-traded index itself can be used by investors to value the options. The difficulty
for investors is in determining which one provides the most timely information for
valuation purposes, because option traders operate in a fast moving market. The volume
on a recent day for the OEX contract was 345,096 contracts. The basket of securities
underlying each contract was worth approximately $52,000. This translates into about
14 contracts traded per second written on $728,000 worth of stocks or $10,920,000
every fifteen seconds. Although most option positions may be hedged, the size of the
volume implies a need for current information.
Using the actual index to price the options involves several problems. First, it
is updated only every fifteen seconds. So, any information revealed and incorporated
in stock values at less than 15 second intervals will not show up in the index
immediately. Second, even when the index changes, not all of the stocks comprising
the index may have adjusted to the new information. Not only does this cause positive
autocorrelation in the index returns, but it provides incomplete information to market
participants.
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Various studies including Stoll and Whaley (1990), Fleming, Ostdiek, and
Whaley (1995), and Swinnerton, Curcio, and Bennet (1988) have shown that futures
incorporate information before the cash index.

In addition, Fleming, Ostdiek, and

Whaley [FOW] (1995) study the lead/lag relationship between the SPX futures’ and the
OEX options’ returns.

They find that the futures slightly lead the options.

They

attribute this to a cost advantage in trading the futures. However, their methodology
does not explicitly show a linkage between the two markets. In fact, Hasbrouck (1993)
points out that this type of lead/lag analysis leaves the possibility that prices can diverge
without bounds. In addition, pricing the option off of the future injects risk into the
pricing function from the fact that the exact relationship between the cash OEX and the
future cannot be known for more than an instant. In fact, only when the option and the
future mature at the same time and when the exact pricing relationship is known can the
future be used to complete a riskless hedge with the option. Even if the future and the
option are written on the same index, the maturity dates must be the same to form the
riskless hedge. So, valuation of the OEX option from the SPX future is risky.
The index implied by put-call parity has the disadvantage in that it is priced from
options, and the goal of this chapter is to find how they are valued. So, this may be a
circular argument. The advantage is that, if those options are priced by knowledgeable
investors, then they contain timely and relevant information.

Furtheremore, if we

assume that some investors use the SPX futures to provide pricing information and
others use the cash OEX or some other proxy, then investors using options to price
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options will be doing so using the information that other investors have deemed
relevant.14 Whether or not the information is timely is problematic.Investors who trade
on information contained in futures prices might have more timely information.
Therefore, the objective here is to find where price discovery actually takes
place, i.e., where information is first entering the system. Another way of saying this
is, "Where is the information coming from that is moving the market?" This idea has
been studied previously for other markets. For instance, some securities are traded in
multiple markets but are priced differently from second to second. The share of stock
in company A that trades on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the same as the
share in company A trading on the Pacific Stock Exchange, but due to cost differentials
or market structures or other imperfections, the prices may be different. The market
with the fewest imperfections, usually in terms of cost, is the one where pricing
information will usually arise first.
Garbade and Silber (1979) study this idea in the context of dominant and satellite
markets. If the price of a security trading in one market adjusts to a price change of the
identical security trading in another market, the first market is called a satellite market
and the second is called the dominant market. The lagged adjustment is caused by some
friction between the two markets, otherwise the prices would adjust simultaneously. The
greater the frictions, the more the prices can drift apart. If they drift too far apart, the
forces of arbitrage will force them back to some equilibrium. On the other hand, if
costs are effectively zero, we would not expect the prices to differ.

l4An investor using this strategy would have to assume that other investors are not also using it.
Otherwise, at an extrem e, no new information would enter the system.
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Garbade and Silber (1979) examine securities on the NYSE, the Midwest Stock
Exchange, and the Pacific Stock Exchange to determine where price discovery takes
place. Their method of analysis consists of studying the price variances of several
stocks trading on the aforementioned exchanges both before consolidated tape reports
became effective and after. The consolidated tape reports reveal trades from all markets,
and, therefore may provide investors with more complete information. They find that
the regional exchanges are satellites of the NYSE but not the opposite. However, they
are not perfect satellites, i.e., after the consolidated tape started operating, the NYSE
prices incorporated some information from the regional markets.
Hasbrouck (1995) examines the idea that there is an unknown efficient price that
links a set of related securities and that by examining the variance of the change in this
price, we can discover where pricing information is coming from. He shows that the
mean of the price changes of this unknown efficient price follows a random walk, but
the variance is influenced by the variance of the traded securities.

Therefore, the

objective is to discover which security’s movements influences the variance of the
efficient price the most. That is where new information first enters the system.
Hasbrouck (1993) uses a method described below to find the upper and lower
bounds for information shares of Boeing, IBM, and Exxon over the NYSE and regional
stock exchanges.

He finds the bounds to be narrow and that the NYSE is largely

responsible for price discovery of these stocks. Also, the S&P 500 futures and index
are examined, and he finds that the maximum price discovery occurs with the futures.
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Choi and Subrahmanyam (1994) use a vector autoregression-vector moving
average approach to measure the degree of change in asymmetric information in stocks
underlying the Major Market Index. They find that asymmetric information increases
in the stocks underlying the MMI after the future is introduced.

Theirs is also a

bivariate system.
This paper seeks to discover where timely pricing information is coming from
in the OEX option market. It will do so using the methodology of Hasbrouck (1995).
Unlike the FOW study, this paper will try to determine whether or not there is an
explicit link between the OEX and the SPX markets through cointegration analysis.
Cointegration implies that there is a common bond linking two or more price series.
This common bond is referred to here as a common efficient price.
The common efficient price refers to an equilibrium relationship between the
series. Over long periods of time, this relationship will hold. This implies that shocks
to the system may cause prices to deviate temporarily from equilibrium or to prevent
them from ever reaching equilibrium. However, over time, the relationship assures us
that deviations between the observed relationship and the theoretical one remains within
certain bounds. Arbitrage possibilities and rational investors guarantee this. In the
current situation, deviations from the relationship between the index variables will occur.
Pricing information from one or more will inform investors as to how far apart from the
equilibrium relationship the prices are. If the prices deviate far enough, arbitrage will
force them back together. If one price provides more information about this relationship

75
than the others, then this is where price discovery occurs. This price causes the system
to react.

3.2

Method of Analysis
The rational for applying the above ideas to this study is as follows. The prices

on the various index variables can be written in general form as p, = m, + s,, where p,
is the price o f the index, m, is the efficient implicit price, and s, is an error term that
incorporates market imperfections. We assume that m, is a random walk where m, = m,.,
+ w, and w, is a series of homoskedastictic uncorrelated innovations.15 w, is the
variable that we want to explain, i.e., price discovery is found in wr The objective is
to find this implicit efficient price in actual prices and decompose its variance in such
a manner that the components of the decomposition can be attributed to the individual
prices. The proportion of the variance due to a particular security is a relative measure
of the information it is providing.
This analysis relies on vector error correction models (VECMs) and vector
moving averages (VMAs). A vector error correction model is related to the concept of
a vector autoregression and consists of a system of equations. The dependent variable
of one equation is regressed on its own lagged values and those of the other dependent
variables. This makes all of the variables are endogenous. The difference between a
VECM and a vector autoregression (VAR) is that one or more error correction terms are
included in each equation of the VECM.

l5In a more general model, this would become a martingale.
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Granger (1981) points out the relationship between cointegration and error
correction models.

Furthermore, Engle and Granger (1987) prove the Granger

Representation Theorem which states that a cointegrated system can be represented as
an error correction model, a vector autoregression, or a moving average. A general
vector autoregression can be written as
yc = k +

+ P2y t _2 + • ■ * + Ppy t _p + e t ,

(17)

where the y /s are price variables, the P’s are (n x n) matrices of coefficients, and the
£, are (n x 1) vectors of white noise where cov(e) is Q. Including the error correction
terms transforms it into a VECM.

The error correction terms constrain the variables

involved to move together over time. The VECM describes the interactions among the
(n x 1) price vector.

If we are examining price changes, then y, = p, - p,.,.

Each

equation in the model can be estimated separately by ordinary least squares. Although
the lagged independent variables may be correlated with previous lagged errors, it is
assumed that they are not correlated with contemporaneous errors. So, ordinary least
squares produces consistent estimators.
One criticism is that in many applications VAR systems have no theoretical
foundation. Sims (1980) answers the criticism by pointing out that even if a theoretical
model is derived, tested, and rejected, this does not necessarily mean that there is no
relationship among the variables in question. It just means that the theoretical model
is wrong.

A VAR might point the researcher to various relationships that are not

theorized or are counter-theoretical.

Vector autoregressions allow the estimating
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equations to take forms permitted by the VAR format that the data imply, rather than
theoretically imposed forms. This is consistent with Granger’s (1969) assertion that the
summary statistics of the data should aid the researcher in model selection. Since the
present analysis seeks to discover the underlying relationship rather than to test a
theoretical model, this technique seems to be particularly appropriate.
As mentioned above, the prices may be cointegrated. The prices are cointegrated
if they are nonstationary and do not drift too far apart. That is what may be found here
and a VECM will be used. If not, the VAR will suffice. Cointegration is evidence of
an equilibrium relationship, and the literature indicates that index futures and options
belong to an equilibrium relationship. The intuition is that both the future and the
option are written on some index, perhaps not the same one, that represents the market.
Therefore, arbitrage will force to follow a common trend.

If this is the case, a

cointegrating vector (error correction term) will have to be added to the VAR
regressions, and we get the VECM. The error correction term can be thought of as the
amount the price series are away from equilibrium and brings long-run dynamics to the
system.
The defining paper on cointegrated time series in economics and finance is
Granger (1981).

Granger uses the gold markets in New York and London as an

example of how cointegration works. If the two markets were completely isolated from
each other, factors in one economy might cause the price of gold in that market to drift
randomly. The price in the other economy might drift randomly also, and there would
be no relationship between the two price series. However, consider the real world.
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Prices in one market are known by traders in the other almost as quickly as they are
updated.

Costs are low, so any price disparity between the two series is quickly

arbitraged away. Therefore the two series drift together over time and are said to be
cointegrated. The same may hold here with the index derivatives. Whether the SPX
proxies for the OEX or vice versa, they are both market indexes. And, to the extent
they correctly represent the "market," they will move together; hence, they should be
cointegrated.
Of course, this presupposes that both are at least 1(1) series. An 1(1) variable is
one that must be differenced once to achieve stationarity. Stationarity is a concept that
indicates the parameters of the distribution are invariant to time. This is important,
because various test statistics lose their interpretability if constructed with nonstationary
data. Therefore, all price series are tested for unit roots and multiple cointegration.
In addition to single equation models, Engle and Granger (1983) point out that
if the data series are cointegrated, there could be problems with a vector autoregression
representation. First, if the system is modelled in levels, important constraints will have
been excluded. Second, the model will be misspecified if only differenced data is used.
Therefore, both levels and differenced data must be used to obtain consistent and
efficient estimators. That is done here, and the cointegrating vectors are developed with
reference to the first lag of the prices.
Finally, the VECM can be inverted into a vector moving average.

This

representation best describes how an innovation affects the system and can be written
as:
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y C= H

+ iMc + ^Me-i + *Me-2

+ • '

(1 7 )

The Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Liitkepohl, and Lee (1985) show that the y s can be calculated
as

Vo = I
V, = B , - 1
Vj = Bj - Bj.,

forj = 2, ...

where the Bs are the coefficients from a VMA that has been derived from a VAR in
price levels using recursive substitution.
Sims (1980) believes the VMA is more easily interpreted than the autoregression,
since the coefficients of the VAR are difficult to characterize due to the oscillations of
the coefficients on successive lags and feedbacks between the equations. Therefore, he
suggests examining the system’s moving average representation. In this form, we can
get a description of how the system reacts to a random shock, which in this paper is the
equivalent to new information entering the market. In a mathematical sense, this is
equivalent to shocking the system with a positive residual of one unit or standard
deviation to each equation in the system. Jhis is most easily seen by examining the \|/s.
These are referred to as impulse response functions. They can be interpreted as
the response by one variable to a unit increase in another variable’s innovation holding
all else constant or
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(18)
However, since the errors in the VECM may be contemporaneously correlated, the
errors are usually orthogonalized.
The orthogonalization takes the innovations and transposes them into
uncorrelated elements.

Therefore, the impulses are in terms of the orthogonalized

innovations. If £2 is the covariance matrix of the VECM and is symmetric and positive
definite, then there exist two triangular matrices such that P P ’ = £2 and P is the lower
triangle.

This is the Cholesky decomposition of £2. The standard deviation of the

orthogonalized innovation lies along the diagonal. The new orthogonalized innovation
is v, = P 'z,.

So instead of speaking in terms of a unit increase in one variable’s

innovation, it now becomes an increase in one standard deviation. In other words,

(19)

The right-hand side of this equation will become important in the calculation of the
information shares.
The process takes the following route. First, we compute the total variance of
the implicit efficient price. This is defined by Hasbrouck (1995) as
a 2w = v a r (w ) = t|r£2t|r/

(

20)
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where \|/ represents a row vector of the matrix 4*. Since it is assumed that the variables
are related by cointegration, each row vector, \|/, sums to the same value. The reason
is that cointegration constrains the price series to have the same reactions to shocks over
time. The objective is to find the portion of this variance that can be assigned to each
price.
Second, as mentioned before, £2 might include positive values on the offdiagonals (i.e., the errors may be correlated across price series). This will yield a non
unique solution.

Therefore, the matrix undergoes a Cholesky decomposition to

orthogonalize the errors. This has the effect of establishing bounds on the information
shares but has the drawback that the ordering of the series matters. In other words, the
first price variable in the system is going to have its share of price discovery
maximized, and the last is going to have its share minimized. Therefore, the analysis
will require each price series to rotate in the order of appearance.
Finally, the share of the variance attributable to a particular price series is shown
in equation (23)

J

_2
Ow

and can be referred to as the information share of the y'th price variable. (\|/P)2j is the
jth element of the corresponding row vector. It should be noted for better understanding
that a 2w can be written as in equation (22) or as (\|/P)I(\|/P)’ with an equivalent value
since £2 = P P \

But, equation (21) shows that the impulse response function after
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orthogonalizing the innovations is (\|tP). So, once (\|/P) is found, the calculation is
relatively easy.
So, the sequence is this:

first, test whether the price series are integrated.

Second, if they are, test for cointegration. Third, form the basic VECM and test for the
number of lags. Fourth, given the number of lags, estimate the VECM and find the
variance-covariance matrix of the system. Fifth, do a Cholesky decomposition of this
matrix.

Sixth, invert the VECM to form a VMA.

Since the series are related by

arbitrage and, in this case, formally through cointegration, the sums of the rows of the
coefficient matrix will be identical. Very simply, this means that since the prices move
together over time, their responses over time to new information or shocks have to be
equivalent. So, the rows of the coefficient matrix of the VMA are summed to form i|/.
Finally, equation 23 is used to find the information shares.

3.3

Data
Three time series are analyzed here. The first is the OEX cash series in five

minute increments each trading day for 1986. It comes from the Berkeley Options
Database.
The second is an implied OEX five minute series. This is found by retaining all
at-the-money OEX options during the day. At-the-money here is defined as being no
more than two percent in-the-money nor less than two percent out-of-the-money.
Observations are kept at five minute intervals. Then, using the dividends and T-bill
rates of return defined in Chapter 1, an implied index series is found by isolating the

83
index variable on one side of the put-call parity equation. The call and put prices are
the midpoints of the bid-ask prices.
The last series is the OEX index implied by the SPX futures. A five minute
series is formed of SPX futures prices. The contract is the one closest to maturity,
because it will have the greatest liquidity. It is rolled over the last day prior to the
expiration week. This mitigates the effects of increased volatility as the expiration
approaches. Otherwise, the variance would be a function of time, and the series would
be nonstationary. The expiration of the futures matches the expiration of the option
series. This was done, because, at maturity, the future equals the index value. Using
a future with a different maturity from the option introduces more risk and would be
much less likely to be used to form a hedge.
To form the OEX implied from the SPX futures, the cash five minute OEX
series is regressed on the SPX futures everyday. Then, the day t-1 coefficients are
applied to the day t SPX futures. Also, since the day t-1 coefficients are being used,
the analysis will begin with the second day in the database, January 3, 1986. There are
17,368 observations for each of the three series in 1986.

3.4

Tests
Initially, the series are tested for unit roots. The null hypothesis is that there is

a unit root in the series. The Phillips-Perron [PP] unit root test is a nonparametric test.
The critical values of the test statistics do not have to be calculated for different data
generating processes. The PP test takes the test statistic and modifies it to correct for
autocorrelation. To be more specific, the PP test uses a nonparametric correction in the

test statistic for the serial correlation. So, it can be used with many different data
generating processes (for instance, see Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry,
(1993).16 The test is run both with and without a trend in the model. With the time
trend in the model, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the time trend and the
lagged dependent variable are jointly equal to zero. This results in an F-statistic. The
results in Table 18 show that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for
all series in either model. Therefore, a search for cointegrating vectors is undertaken.

Table 18. Results of the Phillips-Perron Test
Phillips-Perron Test

OEX Cash

OEX from SPX

OEX from PutCall Parity

With Constant, no Trend

-2.1654

-2.0295

-2.0958

With Constant and Trend

2.7654

2.4534

2.6045

The values o f the statistics do not allow the rejection o f the null hypothesis o f a unit root. The
critical value o f the Phillips-Perron test the .01 level for an infinite sample size is: -3.43 {t value)
with constant but no trend and 6.25 (F value) with constant and trend.

It is important to determine the number of cointegrating vectors in a multivariate
system. If the number of vectors is underestimated, important information is being left
out of the system in the nature of the omitted cointegrating vector(s). If the number is
overestimated, Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry (1993) state that the statistics’

“ A study by Tae-Hwy Lee and Yiuman Tse (1995) suggests that the Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity
is relatively robust to GARCH. They find it tends to over-reject slightly the null o f no cointegration. No
cointegration means that the residuals o f the cointegrating regression are 1(1). So. over-rejecting the null
o f no cointegration is tantam ount to over-rejecting the null that a variable is 1(1) or nonstationary. The
Phillips-Perron test may be m ore robust since it is based on nonparametrics. This is a worthy topic for
future study.
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distributions will not be standard.

Johansen and Juselius (1990) suggest using a

likelihood ratio test. Two test statistics are examined:
n

nr = " (T-l)

i-jr+l

l o g ( l -A 1) , w h e r e r = 0 , 1 , . . . , n - 1

(22)

and
Cr = - ( r - l ) l o g ( l - A r t l ) ,

w h e r e r = 0, l , . . . , n - l

(23)

where T is the number of observations, r is the hypothesized number of cointegrating
vectors, n is the number of time series, and the X's are the eigenvalues from the loglikelihood function of the differenced series.

r| is the trace statistic, and the null

hypothesis is that there are r cointegrating vectors.

£ is the maximal-eigenvalue

statistic, and it tests the significance of the largest Xr. The critical values of the test
statistics are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). Osterwald-Lenum generates several tables
for different data generating processes. The data generation process that is used to
calculate the test statistics corresponds most closely to the one used in his Table 1.1*,
which includes no intercept and no time trend. The Osterwald-Lenum calculates the
tables, because each data generation process has a different asymptotic distribution. So,
care must be taken in selecting the set of critical values by which to judge the test
statistic. The tests agree that there are at most two cointegrating vectors. Table 19
gives the test statistics and critical values.
^2=0.0836322, and ^=0.0000369.

The eigenvalues are ?i|=0.3038201,
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The cointegrating vectors are chosen and interpreted as follows. For the equation
with the dependent variable being the price change of the cash OEX, the vectors are
(Ppcp.t-rp oEx,t-i)

and (Pspxi-r^oEx.i i)' The coefficients of the vectors can be thought of

as the degree the cash OEX is out of equilibrium with the other price series. The
equation with the OEX implied from put-call parity will incorporate the vectors (P PCp,,.r
P oex.li) and (PPCp,,.rp spx,,-i^ and the final equation will use (PSpXj.r p oEx,,-i) and (PPCp,,.r

Pspx.i-i)' Like the first equation, the coefficients on the error correction vectors in these
final two equations can be thought of as a measure of arbitrage that has been generated
by the difference in the two prices.

Table 19. Test Results for the Number of Cointegrating Vectors
£
Maximal-Eigenvalue Test

Critical
Value for £

*1
Trace Test

Critical
Value for
11

n-3 = r = 0

5565.48

25.75

7807.29

37.22

n-2 = r = 1

1516.88

19.19

1517.52

23.52

n -1 = r = 2

0.64

11.65

0.64

11.65

Critical values are for the .01 level o f significance obtained from Osterwatd-Lenum’s (1992)
Table 1.1*. This was chosen, because the data generation process in this paper most closely
matches the process in his Table 1.1*.

The VECM consists of three equations.

In each, a differenced variable is

regressed on the two error correction terms and a finite number of lags of the
differenced variable along with the lags of the other differenced variables. This calls
for a test to determine the appropriate number of lags. To test for the number of lags

to include in a vector autoregression, Sims (1980) suggests using a likelihood ratio test
of the form
(T-k) (log|Z?R| - l o g | u „ | )

(24)

where T is the number of observations, k is the number of regression coefficients being
estimated divided by the number of equations, and DR and Da are the matrices of cross
products of residuals for the restricted and unrestricted models respectively.

He

demonstrates that the usual form of the likelihood ratio test is biased against the null
hypothesis. It is found that five lags is sufficient The model is as follows:

d P o E X .t = a l ( f fp C P ,l - r ^ >OEX,l-l) + a 2 (P S P X , I - ! ' P O E X . 1-1) +

/

+

••■

+

dppcp.i =

fiiidPspx.t-s

+

fiisdPrcp.ti

+

■■■

+

$ ) d P o E X , t i + •■■ +

$2idppcp.t-s

+

^ T ^ P o E X j- 5 +

$ t$ P s P X ,i-

E ;,i

pcp.t-rP onx.ii) + a 4(f>pcp,t-rf>spx.t-i) + &)dppcp,t-i +

+ ^ id p PCPt_5 + ^pdpSPXl.l

+ ... + 5l4dpSPXl.s + $isdPoEX,l-I + ••• + &2ldpoEX.t-5 + e2.;

d p s p x .t =

P P C P .t-l'P S P X .t-l) +

C L * (P s P X .,r POEX,I-1)

+ ... + ’h‘j4dpPCPl.s + h !SdpoEx,t i +

^ ld P s P X .t- 1 + • " + ^ d p s p x j - s

^2]dPoEX,t-5

ej,i

^ x d p p c p .,.1

(25)

where dpOEXl is the difference between the current value of the cash OEX and the value
one period (five minutes) earlier. dpPCPt and dpSPXt are similar values for the OEX index
implied by put-call parity and the SPX futures respectively. A constant term is not
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included. The constant would represent an average return. Since the data is measured
over five minute intervals, it would be negligible and is therefore left out. In a simpler
model without error correction terms and with only differenced prices, each equation
could be viewed as the difference between one equation containing the current prices
and its lags and another equation containing those prices lagged one period.

The

constant would drop out naturally in this case.
Table 20 gives the results of one ordering of the VECM.

This particular

ordering has the OEX cash index first followed by the index implied by the SPX and
then the PCP index. Although the purpose of this paper is not the interpretation of the
VECM, some comments may be in order. First, the cointegrating vectors relative to the
cash OEX index are both positive. Cointegration implies that the difference between
the two variables in the vector is constant except for error. This indicates that as errors
from the implied indexes get "too big," the vector becomes larger, and because the
coefficients are positive, the change in the cash OEX is increased, thus correcting the
error. Or, in finance terminology, an investor would short the implied index and buy
the cash.
Second, the vectors relative to the index implied by put-call parity (PCP) show
that as the PCP index becomes larger, the error correction term grows, and since the
coefficient is negative, the correction is a reduction in the size of the change in PCP.
In other words, short the PCP and buy the other two indexes. This is in accordance
with the interpretation of the OEX vectors above.
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Table 20. Vector Error Correction Model Results.
Dependent Variable
d p OEX.t

d p spx .i

d p p c p .i

Variable

Coeff.

T-stat.

PsPX.l-rPoEX.t-i

0.020

8.034"

P pcp .i r P s p x ,i i

Coeff.

T-stat.

-0.109

-12.180"

Coeff.

T-stat.

-0.019

-8.179"

-0.002

-1.348

PpCP.t-l~PoEX.t-l

0.007

4.368"

-0.194

-7.508"

dPoEX.t -1

-0.518

-64.092"

0.046

0.951

-0.001

-0.121

dPoEX.t -2

0.182

20.115“

0.324

6.045"

-0.008

-1.082

dPoEX.t-3

-0.140

-15.456"

0.076

1.425

-0.004

-0.577

d p OEX.t-4

0.047

5.411"

0.129

2.486*

0.127

1.711

dPoEX.l-S

-0.003

-0.444

0.098

2.186*

0.007

1.087

d p p c p .i-t

-0.004

-2.232*

-0.425

-38.906"

0.003

1.932

-0.001

-0.514

-0.296

-27.361"

0.004

2.855"

d p pcp ,i t

0.0002

0.119

-0.238

-23.163"

0.004

2.570*

d p p c p .t-f

-0.001

-0.510

-0.158

-16.861"

0.002

1.855

dppCP.t-5

-0.001

-1.103

-0.090

-11.898"

0.002

1.625

dP spx.t-i

0.463

49.099"

0.314

5.623**

0.019

2.319*

d p SPX.1-2

0.159

15.806**

0.199

3.323"

-0.017

-1.951

d p SPX,1-3

0.102

10.004"

0.125

2.072*

-0.012

-1.356

dPsPX.t-4

0.023

2.307*

0.084

1.403

-0.002

-0.187

dPsPX,l-5

0.029

2.910"

-0.025

-0.418

-0.004

-0.471

dPpcp.t-2

"Significant at the .01 level, ’Significant at the .05 level; dp0EXl is the price change in the cash
OEX index, dpPCP, is the price change in the OEX index implied by put-call parity, and dpSPXl is
the price change in the OEX index implied by the SPX futures
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Third, the SPX implied index has a negative coefficient on the cointegrating
vector relative to the cash OEX. This is a good fit to what the same vector is saying
in the cash OEX equation: short the SPX implied index and buy the cash index. The
coefficient on the vector relative to the PCP index is also negative as expected but
insignificant.

Except for this last piece of information, the relationships are all

consistent.
Fourth, Huang and Stoll (1995) test the predictive power of the SPX futures’
lagged returns relative to stocks. They find that the futures’ ability to predict stock
quote and price returns is significantly greater than zero. As can be seen in Table 20,
all of the lagged SPX implied index variables are significantly influencing the current
cash OEX. This is consistent with Huang and Stoll’s findings. On the other hand, the
OEX cash index does not seem to be a significant contributor to movements in the SPX
implied index. However, it should be remembered that the SPX implied index is based
on the previous day’s relationship between the SPX futures and the cash OEX.
As the coefficients of the VECM may be difficult to interpret, and the effect of
an innovation is more easily determined from a VMA, a the VECM is converted into
a VMA. The impulse response functions are carried out over twenty periods to aid in
the search for the information shares. As mentioned before, because of the particular
factorization being used, it matters which price series comes first and which comes last.
One such set of VMA coefficients is found in Table 21, but the model is run three
times. This allows all price series to appear once as the first series and once as the last.
The results are in Table 22. A step by step description of the procedure can be found
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Table 21. Impulse Response Functions for the Orthogonalized Innovations.
Each column represents a particular variable’s response to an
innovation plus the response by the two cointegrating vectors
associated with that variable.
5 minute
increments

Implied
Indices
OEX

SPX

PCP

1

0.19495

0.04093

0.05549

2

-0.03657

-0.01280

-0.01126

3

0.09152

0.00690

0.02540

4

-0.07499

-0.01156

-0.02117

5

0.09171

0.02222

0.02327

6

-0.08252

-0.01919

-0.02056

7

0.07194

0.01347

0.01986

8

-0.06837

-0.01266

-0.01863

9

0.06510

0.01224

0.01777

10

-0.06094

-0.01129

-0.01667

.11

0.05857

0.01163

0.01580

12

-0.05508

-0.01073

-0.01486

13

0.05158

0.00970

0.01405

14

-0.02212

0.01742

-0.01330

15

0.04613

0.00879

0.01256

16

-0.04350

-0.00829

-0.01181

17

0.04117

0.00784

0.01113

18

-0.03885

-0.00742

-0.01056

19

0.03664

0.00692

0.00990

20

-0.03465

-0.00660

-0.00943

0.23172

0.05752

0.05698

The last row in each column is the sum of that column.
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Table 22. Information Shares
Maximum Share

Minimum Share

Cash OEX

0.8931

0.8912

OEX Implied by Put-Call Parity

0.0868

0.0539

OEX Implied by SPX Futures

0.0224

0.0049

in Appendix B. It should be noted that the responses are to shocks that have gone
through the system including the cointegrating terms.

The summed columns here

correspond to a summed row in the \j/ matrix. The time interval represents five minutes.
These and different orderings are used to compute the information shares in Table 22.
The OEX cash index and the PCP index each contribute a significant amount of
information. The importance that investors are putting on the OEX is understandable.
It is the stated underlying variable for the options, and if the options are exercised, they
will be exercised into a cash value representing the OEX, not the SPX. Also, and most
important, the OEX is made up of very liquid and highly monitored stocks.

So.

information relevant to the pricing of these securities is rapidly impounded into their
prices.
It is surprising that the SPX proxy index is contributing virtually nothing to price
discovery, because it is also liquid and possibly less costly than the OEX options
market. In fact, Hasbrouck (1993) finds the SPX futures’ information share to range
between 86.5% and 96.7% relative to the SPX cash index.

But, it should be

remembered that the SPX futures’ information share is being measured against the OEX

here and that the method used to form the SPX proxy for the OEX may not be the same
as used by actual traders. Their actual thought processes are not known, but they must
observe the price changes in the SPX and then transform it into some measure relative
to the OEX. In addition, SPX futures traders must get their trading information from
somewhere. If they price the futures off of the cash SPX, they will run into the same
problems as the OEX option traders. However, FOW (1995) show that this is not the
case. Therefore, OEX option traders who price off of the SPX futures must assume that
not only are the SPX traders correctly pricing the futures, but that their own conversion
from the SPX future to the OEX is correct. This injects two sources of risk into the
situation. It may be less risky to just use the cash OEX.
The index implied by PCP also provides a pricing information. The analysis in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that index options can proxy for the index and used
to identify and capture mispricings through arbitrage trades. These trades are providing
information about the relative values of the options to other traders. And, as long as
there are few constraints on arbitragers, the options will be priced efficiently, hence
investors will be able to imply a timely index price from them. Also, transactions costs
are very low. Fleming and Whaley (1995) show that transactions costs are much lower
to trade a portfolio of index options than it is to trade the basket of stocks replicating
the index. Chapter 2 of this dissertation also points that out. Informed investors are
going to place their trades in low cost liquid markets. The OEX option market is such
a market, so it should not be surprising that some price discovery takes place there.
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Perhaps it is more surprising that a larger proportion of price discovery takes place in
the higher cost cash OEX market.

3.5

Chapter 3 Summary
OEX options have no single traded security underlying them.

This makes

valuation difficult. It obscures the source of relevant pricing information. For a market
to be efficient, timely information must be available to investors to act on. Various
pricing proxies have been suggested as being suitable for the purpose, such as the SPX
futures.
The methodology used here to discover where investors are obtaining their
information relies on the concept that a group of securities is linked by arbitrage. In a
statistical sense, they are cointegrated. Both terms imply that the price movements of
all of the securities will move together over time.

Therefore, there must be an

equilibrium price or implied efficient price that is common to all of the price series.
The technique seeks to identify the efficient price variance, and once that is
accomplished, to attribute portions of that variance to the actual price series. The series
claiming the highest percentage of the variance is the one that is providing the most
timely information to the market.
The price series in question are the OEX cash index and two proxies:

one

formed from the SPX futures and the other from index options. Extant literature has
shown impirically (i.e., Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1995)) that the SPX futures
provide price discovery to the OEX options. However, here it is found that little of the
variance in the implied efficient price can be attributed to the futures. This could be
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due to the way the index was constructed. Future research should investigate the system
using the actual SPX futures prices rather than the implied OEX index.
The largest source of price discovery is found in the OEX index itself. Since the
OEX market is very liquid, this should not be too surprising.

It is somewhat

counterintuitive, because of the three markets, this is the most costly. The next largest
source of price discovery is found in the index implied by put-call parity. Since the
market is relatively efficient and low-cost, it should not be surprising that option traders
can imply an index from put-call parity that provides timely information.

CONCLUSION
This dissertation has the following major contributions.

First, it finds a

reasonable estimate of early exercise for American options. In finding this value, it is
demonstrated how data collected at different times and over different cross-sections can
affect the results. Then, it is shown how this value can be used to with the BlackScholes option pricing model to value American style options more efficiently. If these
securities are priced closer to their efficient values, resources can be allocated more
effectively to other sectors of the economy. Also, to the extent that investors use these
options for price discovery, other assets will be priced more efficiently.
Second, various proxies have been suggested in the literature for the underlying
index to be used in forming arbitrage portfolios. The effect of arbitrage is to identify
and capture mispricings. By doing so, option prices are forced back toward equilibrium
levels. It is shown that forming optimal mimicking portfolios of stocks is risky due to
the tracking error. However, proxies made up from other options or index futures are
viable alternatives.
Third, a source of price discovery is found. Using three proxies for the OEX,
it is found that the cash OEX is the variable investors look to for most of their
information. The actual index options are also important sources. The SPX provides
little or no contribution to price discovery. This is the reverse of what other researchers
have found, but this discrepancy may be due to the way in which the OEX proxy was
formed from the SPX futures.
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The dissertation also implies several extensions. First, further work is indicated
in the index arbitrage study. Index fund managers face a tradeoff between tracking error
and transactions costs. Optimal mimicking portfolios could be developed with these
variables in mind.

Also other methods of developing optimal portfolios could be

developed. For instance, instead of forming a portfolio whose return tracks the index’s
return, a portfolio whose securities have the same beta as the index could be tried.
Second, a study could be done on the effect of SPDR’s on index arbitrage.
While the volume is currently less than the SPX futures, these are becoming more
important to fund managers. The study could look at index arbitrage both before and
after SPDR’s became available.
And, third, the methodology used in the price discovery chapter has never been
used with equity options. Currently, researchers have found conflicting directions of
price discovery between equity options and the underlying options. This technique
could be used to help resolve the issue.
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APPENDIX A
Table A l. Summary of Initial Five Minute Interval Data
Initial Number
of Prices

Number of Nonsynchronous Prices

Final Number o f Prices
Matching for Put-Call Parity1

January

103967

3741

100226

February

91664

2930

88734

March

81136

1628

79508

April

90784

2598

88186

May

82940

2700

80240

June

85121

1847

83274

July

83967

5187

78780

August

79691

2707

76984

September

78607

2525

76082

October

82588

1766

80822

November

70795

1391

69404

December

76777

2487

74290

1,008,038

31,508

976,530

Month
1986

Total

‘These figures are before deleting expiration week observations.

Table A2. Statistics on the Variables
Mean

Standard Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

S&P 100 Index

224.957

10.5292

195.840

242.030

Strike Price

223.446

14.1981

175.000

255.000

Call Bid

8.6837

6.215

0.5000

34.000

Put Ask

6.9092

5.473

0.5625

35.000

T-bill Rates

0.0602

0.007

0.0375

0.0782

Disc. Divs.

1.4234

0.7422

0.2223

3.2332

Days to Mat.

66.05

0.084

8.00

123.999

Variable
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APPENDIX B
To find the information shares, the innovations are orthogonalized as outlined in
the text. The rows of the impulse response functions of the orthogonalized innovations
are summed.

One such summation can be seen in Table 22. This leads to the y

summed matrix values, 0.23172, 0.05752, and 0.0698 corresponding to the cash OEX,
SPX implied OEX, and PCP implied OEX, respectively.
Then, using the y P matrix, the variance of the system is found:
a 2 = (yP)I(yP)1 = 0.060249
Finally, the information shares are derived as (yP)2 / a 2, and in this case are
0.8912, 0.0549, and 0.0539 for the cash OEX, the OEX implied by the futures, and the
OEX implied by put-call parity.
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